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Abstract
This Article discusses the Conseil de la Concurrence (”Conseil”), established by the Decem-
ber 1986 Ordinance on the Freedom of Prices and Competition. It provides an examination of
the case law on media competition issues in France and suggests that such issues raise complex
questions and that great caution must be exercised when applying competition law in this sector.
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INTRODUCTION
During the nearly eleven years since its creation, the Conseil
de la Concurrence ("Conseil") has delivered more than fifty de-
cisions or opinions dealing with competition issues in the media
sector. This sector has thus been the object of close scrutiny by
the French competition authority. The Conseil, established by
the December 1986 Ordinance on the Freedom of Prices and
Competition' ("Ordinance"), is entrusted with the task of inves-
tigating and adjudicating cases dealing with practices having the
goal or the effect of restraining competition. Such cases include
anticompetitive cartels and concerted actions prohibited by Arti-
cle 7 of the Ordinance, anticompetitive abuses of dominant posi-
tions prohibited by the first paragraph of Article 8 of the Ordi-
nance, and anticompetitive abuses of negotiating power prohib-
ited by the second paragraph of Article 8 of the Ordinance.
Article 10 of the Ordinance, however, provides for two types of
exemptions for anticompetitive practices: a legal exemption
when a law prescribes the anticompetitive practice, and an eco-
nomic exemption when the authors of the anticompetitive prac-
tices can show that these practices led to economic progress that
could not have been obtained otherwise and that this benefit was
passed on to consumers.
In the merger control area, the Conseil merely has an advi-
sory function. Mergers are controllable if the merging firms
meet either a market share threshold of twenty-five percent of a
relevant domestic market or a size threshold of seven billion
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1. Ordonnance No. 86-1243 du ler dcembre 1986 relative a la libert6 des prix et
de la concurrence, 1986J.O. 14773 (modifi6 par Loi No. 87-499 dujuillet 1987) [Ordi-
nance No. 89-1243 of December 1, 1986, Relating to Freedom of Prices and Competi-
tion] (Fr.), reprinted inJ. WILLIAM RowLEY & DONALD I. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL MERGERS:
THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 333 (1991).
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Francs aggregate turnover for the merging firms, provided that
two of the merging parties have an individual turnover of at least
two billion Francs. The Minister of Economic Affairs and the
minister in charge of the relevant economic sector can decide to
block a merger or to impose conditions on controllable mergers
after the merger has been referred for appraisal to the Conseil.
Although the ministers are not bound by the opinion of the
Conseil, they must publish this opinion together with their joint
decision. The role of the Conseil in merger analysis is to assess
whether the potential anticompetitive effect of the merger is
counterbalanced by a sufficient contribution to economic pro-
gress.
The Ordinance applies to all activities of production, distri-
bution, or services, and thus includes the media sector. Various
media sub-sectors are regulated, particularly, television, cable tel-
evision, radio, and, to a lesser extent, films. In certain cases, this
regulation limits the scope of action of the Conseil or implies
some sort of shared responsibility between the Conseil and one
of the sectoral regulators. Over the last ten years, the Conseil
has examined two mergers in the movie industry,2 one merger
between weekly news magazines,' one merger between publish-
ers, 4 and one merger between radio stations.5  Besides these
merger cases, the Conseil has also investigated and adjudicated
numerous cases of alleged violations of competition law in the
movie industry,6 the press,7 television,' cable industries, 9 elec-
2. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1993 at 510,
Avis No.93-A-12 relatif A l'acquisition par la Socit6 U.G.C. des salles de cinema des
complexes George V, Forum Horizon, et Forum Orient-Express; Conseil de la concur-
rence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1993 at 488, Avis No. 93-A-01 relatif a la
cession r~ciproque de salles de cinema entre les Soci~t~s Gaumont et Path6 Cinema ou
certaines de leurs filiales.
3. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1993 at 520,
Avis No. 93-A-13 relatif A la prise de participation de la Socit6 G~nrale Occidentale
dans le capital de la soci~t6 d'exploitation de l'hebdomadaire Le Point.
4. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1994, Rapport annuel pour l'annfe 1994 at 684,
Avis No. 94-A-22 relatif i l'acquisition de la Socit6 des Codes Rousseau par la Socit6
Mdia Communication.
5. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1994, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1994 at 707,
Avis No. 94-A-26 relatif A la prise de contr6le par la Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de
T6ldiffusion des stations Fun Radio et M40.
6. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1988, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1988 at 116,
Dcision No. 88-MC-04 relative aux demandes pr~sent~es par les Soci~t~s F6licit6 Films,
Karl Films, Felix Films, et Utopia Latin; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1988, Rapport
annuel pour l'ann~e 1988 at 125, Dcision No. 88-MC-14 relative A une demande de
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mesures conservatoires 6manant de.l'Union des producteurs de films; Conseil de la
concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e 1989 at 1:38, Dcision No. 89-D-40
relative A une saisine 6manent de Monsieur Lucien Adira; Conseil de la concurrence,
D. 1990, Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e 1990 at 157, D6cision No. 90-MC-09 relative a
une demande de mesures conservatoires pr~sente par Monsieur Michel Champetier;
Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1990, Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e 1990 at 137, D6cision
No. 90-D-47 concernant l'ex6cution de la d6cision No 90-MC-09 du 4juillet 1990 rela-
tive A des mesures conservatoires prises A l'encontre du Syndicat des producteurs de
films publicitaires; Conseil de la concurrence. D. 1991, Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e
1991 at 109, DEcision No. 91-D45 relative A la situation de la concurrence sur le march6
de l'exploitation de films dans les salles de cin6ma; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1992,
Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e 1992 at 229, Dcision No. 92-D-21 concernant l'ex6cution
de la d6cision No 90-MC-09 du 4juillet 1990 relative a des mesures conservatoires prises
A l'encontre du Syndicat des producteurs de films publicitaires; Conseil de la concur-
rence, D. 1992, Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e 1992 at 282, Dcision No. 92-D-32 relative
A des pratiques mises en oeuvre par le Syndicat des producteurs de films publicitaires
(S.P.F.P.).
7. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'anne 1989 at 25,
D&ision No. 89-D-05 relative A des pratiques mises en oeuvre par le journal Nice-Matin;
Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'annge 1989 at 131, Decision
No. 89-D-37 relative a une saisine 6manant de la SA.R.L. Publi-Cazal contre la S.A.
Socigt6 de Presse de la Reunion et la S.A.R.L. Editions et Presse de la Reunion; Conseil
de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1989 at 207, Avis No. 89-A-08
relatif a une question posge par I'Association pour la promotion de la presse magazine
et concernant les taux de taxe sur la valeur ajoutge applicable aux quotidiens, At leurs
supplements, et aux publications pdriodiques; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rap-
port annuel pour l'annEe 1989 at 177, DEcision No. 89-MC-06 relative i une demande
de mesures conservatoires prgsentge par la S.A. La Dgp che du Midi et Le Petit
Toulousain et par le Syndicat de la presse quotidienne r~gionale; Conseil de la concur-
rence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'annge 1989 at 178, DEcision No. 89-MC-07 rela-
tive As une demande de mesures conservatoires pr~sentge par la Chambre syndicale des
diffuseurs de presse et de l'6dition de Haute-Garonne; Conseil de la concurrence, D.
1991, Rapport annuel pour l'anne 1991 at 59, D&ision No. 91-D-21 relative au secteur
de la presse As Toulouse; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour
l'ann~e 1993 at 270, DEcision No. 93-D-37 relative A une saisine de la Socit6 pour la
promotion de la presse rggionale; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel
pour l'ann~e 1993 at 273, D&ision No. 93-D-38 relative A une saisine d'office portant
sur la clause du protocole d'accord liant la Socit pour la promotion de la presse
rigionale A ses distributeurs.
8. Conseil de ]a concurrence, D. 1988, Rapport annuel pour l'anne 1988 at 96,
Decision No. 88-D-41 relative i une saisine 6manent de la Soci& La Cinq S.A.; Conseil
de la concurrence, D. 1988, Rapport annuel pour l'annge 1988 at 96, Decision No. 88-
D-42 relative A une saisine 6manent de la Socit Mgtropole Tl(vision M6; Conseil de
la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'anne 1989 at 188, Dcision No. 89-
MC-13 relative a une demande de mesures conservatoires pr~sente par la Soci~t6 La
Cinq S.A.; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1990, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1990 at 73,
Dcision No. 90-D-21 relative aux accords conclus entre les syndicats d'artistes-inter-
prtes, des organismes de communication audiovisuelle, et certains producteurs
d'6missions de tgl vision; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1991, Rapport annuel pour
l'annge 1991 at 166, D&ision No. 91-MC-05 relative A une demande de mesures conser-
vatoires pr~sent~e par la Socit6 La Cinq S.A.; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1991,
Rapport annuel pour l'ann4e 1991 at 42, Decision No. 91-D-11 concernant les Organ-
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tronic communications,'" news agencies,"1 and telephone direc-
tory publishing.12 Prior to the creation of the Conseil in 1986,
the Commission de ]a Concurrence, a purely advisory body
charged with giving opinions on competition issues to the Minis-
ter of Economic Affairs, dealt with allegations of anticompetitive
practices in the media sector and particularly by newspapers 3
and television.' 4 In the course of this Article we will review some
selected issues raised by the case law.
I. RELEVANT MARKET DEFINITION AND THE MEDIA
The definition of relevant markets is an important and com-
plex issue in most competition cases involving the media sector.
As early as 1986, in a decision concerning newspapers, the Com-
mission de la Concurrence concluded that some media may of-
fer two types of services. One type of service is directed at the
general public, where the media entity provides either general
ismes franais de radiodiffusion et tfl~vision (O.F.R.T.); Conseil de la concurrence, D.
1992, Rapport annuel pour l'ann&e 1992 at 422, D&ision No. 92-D-58 relative a une
saisine de la Soci&t6 La Cinq S.A.
9. Conseil de ]a concurrence, D. 1991, Rapport annuel pour l'anne 1991 at 130,
DEcision No. 91-D-51 relative au march6 des programmes de t~l~vision r~serv~s A la
diffusion sur les rfseaux cables; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1992, Rapport annuel
pour l'anne 1992 at 449, Decision No. 92-D-65 relative A une saisine de la Socit6
Cit~cable.
10. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1992, Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e 1992 at 294,
Decision No. 92-D-35 relative At une saisine de la Soci&6t du Journal T6lphon6 A
l'encontre de la direction de la Mktorologie Nationale; Conseil de la concurrence, D.
1995, Rapport annuel pour l'ann&e 1995 at 472, D&ision No. 95-D-58 concernant
l'ex&ution de la d&ision No. 92-D-35 relative i une saisine de la Soci&t du Journal
T6lphon6 A l'encontre de la direction de la M&6torologie Nationale.
11. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'ann&e 1989 at 133,
Decision No. 89-D-38 relative A une saisine de la Soci&t6 Plurim~dia.
12. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1996, Rapport annuel pour l'ann& 1996 at 217,
D&ision No. 96-D-10 relative A des pratiques mises en oeuvre par France T6l&om et
par l'Office d'annonces (ODA).
13. Commission de la concurrence, D. 1986, Rapport de la Commission de la con-
currence pour l'anne 1986, Annexe I at 12, Avis sur les conditions d'application du
dernier alin~a de I'article 50 de l'ordonnance No. 45-1483 du 30juin 1945 a des prati-
ques d'abaissement s~lectif de prix dans le secteur de la presse quotidienne
d'information locale; Commission de la concurrence, D. 1986, Rapport de la commis-
sion de la concurrence pour l'ann&e 1986, Annexe 7 at 51, Avis relatif A la situation de
la concurrence dans le secteur de la presse gratuite en region Provence-Alpes-C6te
d'Azur.
14. Commission de la concurrence, D. 1983, Rapport de la commission de la con-
currence pour l'ann~e 1983, Annexe 14 at 269, Avis relatif i la situation de la concur-
rence sur le march6 des productions destinies A la tfl~vision.
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or specialized information, such as news. The other type of ser-
vice is selling advertising space or time to advertisers. Depend-
ing on the competition problem at hand, the relevant market in
media cases may have to be defined from the point of view of
service to the public or from the point of view of service to adver-
tisers. In some cases, both approaches may be simultaneously
warranted.
It is particularly difficult to define relevant markets in this
sector, not only because of the high level of differentiation of
the content communicated by the various media, but also be-
cause of the fact that the way the communication takes place and
when it takes place are also elements of differentiation of the
services offered. In addition, for certain medias, such as newspa-
pers, magazines or movie houses, the geographical dimension of
relevant markets must also be explored. As will become clear
when we review the case law on film exhibition in movie houses,
a time dimension may also contribute to the differentiation of
media markets. Finally, the regulatory environment of the par-
ticular medium examined must also be considered to assess rele-
vant markets. In many cases, the definition of relevant markets
in the media sector depends more on qualitative judgment than
on scientific evidence, thereby making the definition itself a sub-
ject of contention. Excessively broad or excessively narrow mar-
ket definition can render competition law irrelevant. Although
market power tends to disappear as the definition of the relevant
market becomes broader, the narrower the definition of the rel-
evant market, the less scope there is for possible competition be-
tween media service providers.
To a certain extent, going to the movies or watching televi-
sion are alternative ways of spending leisure time, just as listen-
ing to a newscast or reading a newspaper are alternate ways of
keeping up to date with current events. The fact that, in the
long term, some media become more popular and others fall
out of favor, combined with the existence of economies of scope
or scale in the provision of different media services, means that
from a long term strategic standpoint the media operate on a
global market. This partly explains the prevalence of groups si-
multaneously engaged in providing services via several or all
types of media. As a result, the claim that there is a global mar-
ket for film, news, or audiovisual entertainment is more than just
a legal argument designed to avoid the rigors of competition
1998]
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law. The long term substitutability of media does not necessarily
mean that a short term substitutability also exists, however.
Therefore, the definition of the contours of relevant markets by
competition authorities necessarily entails an implicit choice on
the part of such authorities regarding the time frame in which
they carry out their analysis.
Competition authorities traditionally focus more on short
term competition than on long term perpectives. The Conseil
clearly has followed that approach and, therefore, has tended to
define markets rather narrowly. A choice of this type is not neu-
tral in the sense that, from a competitive point of view, depend-
ing on the definition of the market, one can interpret the same
acts differently. For example, because the Conseil believed that
movie viewing was not substitutable for other forms of entertain-
ment, such as watching television, reading books, or going to the
theater or the opera, even though the development of television
broadcasting has, over the long term, coincided with a signifi-
cant decrease in movie house attendance, the Conseil objected
to mergers tending to increase concentration in the exhibition
of films in Paris. Additionally, the Conseil did not regard differ-
ent media as substitutable one for another for advertising pur-
poses. Although they may indeed be so in the long term, as it is
clear that newspaper advertising revenues decreased when televi-
sion advertising was introduced, the Conseil found that rebates
given for the joint purchase of advertising time on three radio
stations or for space in two news magazines impaired competi-
tion. We will return to the question of whether such a short
term approach is justified at the conclusion of this Article.
A. Relevant Wholesale and Retail Markets for News
In a 1989 decision concerning a news agency, 5 the Conseil
defined several newsmarkets. In this case, the central question
was whether Agence France Presse ("AFP"), the largest French
news agency, had abused its dominant position when it discon-
tinued a subscription to its general news service by Verimedia.
Verimedia was the would-be publisher of a magazine that in fact
never existed because Verimedia, rather than using the informa-
tion provided by AFP's general news service to publish a newspa-
15. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour I'ann6e 1989, An-
nexe 45 at 133, Dcision No. 89-D-38 relative A une saisine de la Socit6 Plurim~dia.
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per, had instead used it to create a videotext news service on the
Minitel, a low speed videotext system with proprietary software
specific to France. In the course of its discussion of this issue,
the Conseil first examined whether to distinguish between
rough, uncut news dispatches provided by a newsagency to such,
media as newspapers, radio, or television stations and the news
as presented to the public by the media. It held that, even if the
news produced by the media was based on news dispatches pro-
vided by a news agency, the role of the media was to select, edit,
and present the news according to an editorial policy. The trans-
formed news thereby produced was not substitutable for the
rough, uncut news distributed by news agencies. In other words,
the Conseil distinguished between wholesale markets and retail
news markets. AFP was operating on two different markets be-
cause AFP was providing both unedited news to the media and
edited news to the public on its own videotext service.
Additionally, the Conseil held that a news item presented
on the radio was not substitutable for a commented image relat-
ing the same event on television, for a written account of that
event published in a newspaper, or for an online videotext ser-
vice providing edited news to the general public. It thus held
that, although AFP's Minitel on-line videotext news service could
be in the same market as other online videotext services provid-
ing edited news, it was not in the same market as newspapers,
television, or radio broadcast news programs. Finally, the Con-
seil decided that although- AFP was not the only provider of
rough, uncut news, it nevertheless had a dominant position in
this market in France because it provided more extensive cover-
age than any other news agency of news relevant to the French
audience and because all French media had to subscribe to its
general information service.
The Conseil developed a similar type of analysis in a 1992
decision involving the provision of weather bulletins to the gen-
eral public.' 6 At the time, the French weather bureau, M6t6ro-
logie Nationale, was a division of the ministry responsible for
transportation. Among its public services were the general sur-
16. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1992, Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e 1992, An-
nexe 42 at 294, D6cision No. 92-D-35 en date du 13 mai 1995 relative t une saisine de la
SocitE du Journal T61phon l'encontre de la direction de la MtEorologie Nation-
ale.
1998]
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veillance of national weather conditions and the provision of
weather data to aircraft pilots. In the late 1980s, the M&trologie
Nationale had developed a weather bulletin service accessible to
the general public via Minitel, the French vidotext system. In
addition to this service, the Mt6rologie Nationale had also de-
veloped and made available on the Minitel, a specialized service
of weather bulletins for aircraft pilots providing the specific data
that the pilots were required to consult before embarking on any
flight. Although at the time this service was accessible to any
person having access to a phone line and to a Minitel monitor,
the information provided was coded and understandable only by
licensed pilots. The M&t rologie Nationale also had a weather
bulletin service accessible to the general public by telephone.
The Soci&t dujournal T6lphon6, a private company using
technology allowing it to transform electronic weather data auto-
matically into voice messages, wanted to produce a weather bul-
letin accessible to the general public by telephone that would
compete with the service offered by the M&trologie Nationale.
In order to produce this service and presumably differentiate it
from telephonic weather bulletins offered to the general public
by the M&trologie Nationale, the Soci&t dujournal T616phon6
asked the M&t rologie Nationale to sell it the weather data that
the latter was using to produce its videotext weather service for
aircraft pilots because this data was available electronically and
also contained very precise weather data for a number of locali-
ties with airports. After some hesitation, the M&t rologie Na-
tionale refused to make this data available to the Soci&t dujour
nal T lMphon6. The Soci&6 du journal T6l6phon6 then argued
that this refusal to sell was an anticompetitive abuse of the domi-
nant position held by the M&t rologie Nationale in the weather
bulletin market.
In assessing whether the M&6rologie Nationale held a dom-
inant position, the Conseil decided that the M&t rologie Nation-
ale was operating both in the wholesale weather data market and
in two separate retail markets: the weather bulletin market for
the general public and the weather bulletin market for aircraft
pilots. The Conseil held that, even if rough uncut weather data
for aircraft pilots could be edited and used to provide weather
bulletins for the general public, the weather bulletin service
aimed at the general public and the specialized Minitel weather
bulletin service for aircraft pilots provided by the Wt&rologie
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Nationale were not substitutes for each other because they con-
tained partially different information and because the data pro-
vided to aircraft pilots was given in a form that was not easily
understood by non-pilots.1 7
B. Relevant Markets for Film
In 1993, the Conseil was called upon to give its opinion on
two mergers in the movie industry involving the transfer of own-
ership of movie theaters."8 In both cases the Conseil first had to
assess whether the market shares of the parties to the agreement
reached the threshold of twenty-five percent of a relevant market
because this condition was required for merger control to apply.
The parties involved in the first case argued that the relevant
market was the market for films that included films shown in
movie theaters, on television, and through video cassette record-
ers because all three were alternative ways of exhibiting films.
To buttress this argument the parties suggested that the general
decline in movie theater attendance was a direct consequence of
the increase in the number of films shown on television and of
the development of videocassettes. They argued that this histori-
17. On the substance of the issue, the Conseil decided that the M&rologie Na-
tionale held a dominant position on both markets, but had not abused its dominant
position for two reasons. First, it had offered to make available in electronic form other
meteorological data which could be used by the Soci&t6 dujournal T616phon6 to create
a weather bulletin service available to the general public. Second, the Conseil was im-
pressed by the argument that making available, directly or indirectly, specialized data
for aircraft pilots so that the data could then be edited and simplified for the general
public might create a security risk if private pilots decided to use this information in its
simplified form rather than getting the complete meteorological data for aeronautics
that they needed before embarking on a flight. The Paris Court of Appeals overturned
the Conseil's decision and decided that neither the offer by the M&6rologie Nationale
to provide other data nor the alleged security risk could be used to justify what was an
attempt by a dominant firm to prevent a potential competitor from entering the field.
The French Supreme Court subsequently overturned the decision of the Paris Court of
Appeals on the ground that French antitrust law did not apply to the Mt6rologie Na-
tionale. Eventually the M&&ologie Nationale and the Soci6t6 du Journal T616phonE
settled out of court. The requested information is currently made available to the So-
ci6tE du Journal T16phon.
18. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e 1993, An-
nexe 75 at 488, Avis No. 93-A-01 en date du 12 janvier '1993 relatif la cession
r6ciproque de salles de cinema entre les Soci~t~s Gaumont et PathE Cin6ma ou
certaines de leur filiales; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour
l'ann6e 1993, Annexe 79 at 510, Avis No. 93-A-12 en date du 29 juin 1993 relatif A
l'acquisition par la Soci&t U.G.C. des salles de cinema des complexes George V, Forum
Horizon, et Forum Orient-Express.
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cal evolution of film viewing established that there was a sole
market for exhibiting films. The Conseil disagreed with this
analysis, basing its argument on two main considerations. It ar-
gued that film viewing was only one aspect of the services ren-
dered by movie theaters. Movie theaters also provided viewing
comfort, including screen size and comfortable seating, and vari-
ous other forms of entertainment, such as being part of an audi-
ence, watching previews of coming attractions, and buying re-
freshments. The Conseil thus held that services rendered by
movie theaters were different from services rendered by the
rental or purchase of videocassettes or by watching films on tele-
vision. The Conseil also considered the fact that, in France,
films shown in movie theaters often differ from those shown on
television due to specific regulations applying to film exhibition
in that country. In France, films shown in movie theaters cannot
be shown on television for one year after their initial release and
videocassettes of such films cannot be sold for two years after
their initial movie theater release.
Another issue in these cases was the geographical dimen-
sion of the relevant market for film exhibitions. More specifi-
cally, the Conseil had to decide whether movie theaters located
in central Paris constituted a different market from movie thea-
ters located in the suburbs of Paris. Due to the specificity of film
release in France, where it is acknowledged that the ultimate
commercial success of a film depends heavily on the success or
failure of its first week's showing in the major first run movie
theaters of central Paris, the Conseil decided that Parisian movie
theaters, whose clientele account for twenty-five percent of all
movie tickets sold in France, constituted a substantial part of a
relevant market.
In a merger case involving the acquisition by Canal +, the
only pay-television station in France, of a majority of the capital
of UGC DA, the owner of the broadcast rights of 5,000 French
films, the Minister indicated how he viewed television program
markets." The Minister indicated that for television programs,
one should distinguish between programs considered to be of
19. Bulletin Officiel de la concurrence de la consommation et de la Repression
des Fraudes, le 5 dcembre 1996 at 608, Lettre du ministre d~lgu6 aux finances et au
commerce extirieur en date du 7 octobre 1996 relative A une concentration dans le
secteur des droits audinvisiiels.
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lasting value, such as films, series, documentaries, and cartoons,
on the one hand and programs considered to be of temporary
value, such as news magazines, interviews, major sports events,
and generally any kind of live broadcast show. This distinction is
similar to the distinction made at the European level. The Min-
ister noted that the financing methods for these two categories
of programs differ, the programs of lasting value being in many
cases produced by independent producers who then sell the
rights to television stations and programs of temporary value
usually being directly produced by broadcasters. In addition,
the commercial prospects of these programs differ because films
or series can be broadcast in several countries, whereas the sec-
ond type of programs is usually of limited interest abroad. Fi-
nally, and most importantly, regulatory constraints apply in the
case of lasting value programs, whereas no such constraints apply
to the broadcasting of temporary value programs. The Minister
argued that, within the lasting value program category, a distinc-
tion should be made between fiction and documentaries. Fur-
thermore, within the fiction category, a distinction should be
made between television series and feature films because multi-
episode series serve a different purpose than that of one-time
broadcasts of feature films. The Minister's decision suggested
that another distinction should be made between made-for-tele-
vision telefilms and feature films due to differences in quality
and financing methods and the fact that feature films usually
attract much larger television audiences than do telefilms.
Therefore, feature film broadcasting is an absolute necessity for
general purpose channels.
According to the Minister, the fact that the regulatory envi-
ronment, on the one hand, imposed a maximum 192 film per
year limit on the number of films which could be shown on tele-
vision and, on the other hand, made it an obligation for forty
percent of the films or series broadcast on television to be
French-made, implied two things: that French and foreign-made
films were not substitutable for each other and, also that there
were two separate markets for television film broadcast rights:
one for foreign films and one for French films. Although one
may question the relevance of some of the criteria used by the
Minister in his analysis, one could nevertheless agree that the
regulatory constraints faced by television broadcasters in France
for French-made fiction programming imply that there are sepa-
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rate markets for television broadcasting rights to French films
and to foreign films.
Following the approval of the merger involved in this case, a
pay-per-view television operator complained to the Conseil that
Canal +, which had a dominant position in the market for
French-made feature film broadcast rights due to its ownership
of the rights to 5,000 French-made films and because it bought
the broadcast rights of the majority of newly-made French films,
abused its dominant position. It did so, on the one hand, by
refusing to sell the rights for pay-per-view broadcasting to this
pay-per-view television operator and on the other hand, by main-
taining exclusivity over the rights for both pay-television broad-
casting and pay-per-view television broadcasting of newly-made
French films. This case, which remains pending, raises the ques-
tion of whether pay-television operators and pay-per-view televi-
sion operators compete in the same market.
C. Relevant Markets for Books
Although book publishing may be somewhat outside the
scope of this Article, it is worth mentioning a case dealt with by
the Conseil in 1989, both because this case raised questions
about market definition that might be relevant to the issue of
market definition in the media sector, and particularly, to the
issue of whether pay-per-view television services are different
from pay-television services, and because it raised questions
about exclusivity clauses in the purchase of copyrights." From
the point of view of relevant market definition, the issue was
whether book clubs were in the same market as bookstores. Bas-
ing its decision on a number of factors, the Conseil decided that
there was a separate market for book clubs. First, the Conseil
decided that the type of contract signed by book club members
was different from the contract they entered into with regular
bookstores. In particular, the Conseil based its decision on the
fact that book club members agreed to acquire a certain number
of the books selected by the club during a set period of time,
while no such agreement existed between consumers and book-
stores. It therefore decided that consideration of the contracts
20. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1989, An-
nexe 48 at 139, Dkision No. 89-D-41 relative A la situation de la concurrence dans le
secteur de la vente de livre par clubs.
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between bookbuyers and booksellers was relevant to market defi-
nition. The Conseil also decided that the way in which books
were physically delivered, by mail in the case of book clubs and
by sale in a shop in the case of bookstores, as well as the possibil-
ity of preselection available to book club members, but not to
bookstore customers, was significant when deciding whether the
services offered by the two entities were competitive. Finally, the
Conseil took into consideration the regulatory environment that
allows book clubs to offer books at a discount, but prevents them
from selling books within nine months of their initial bookstore
release., Therefore, the time dimension of the release of a crea-
tive work through different commercial channels was deemed a
relevant consideration in market definition. Because of the sep-
arate market for book clubs, the Conseil thus decided that
France-Loisirs, the largest French book club and a joint subsidi-
ary of a French publishing company and the Bertelsmann
Group, had a dominant position in this market.
The Conseil's underlying reasoning in the book club case
may indicate the reasoning it would follow for television services,
particularly with regard to film broadcasting by pay-television
And pay-per-view television services. To the extent that the con-
tractual arrangements between service providers and consumers
in the case of pay-television or in the case of pay-per-view are
different, pricing of the respective services is established on dif-
ferent bases. The minimum time periods from initial release in
movie theaters that these two types of television services must
respect before they can broadcast a film are different and regu-
lated in a way not dissimilar to the way books are regulated.
The book club case is also interesting because it gives an
indication that the French Supreme Court may have difficulty in
accepting such criteria when defining relevant markets. The
Conseil book club case decision was appealed to the Paris Court
of Appeals which affirmed the Conseil's analysis. The case was
then appealed to the Cour de Cassation, the French supreme
civil courit, which overturned the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals based upon the fact that the Conseil had not sufficiently
justified the existence of a separate market for book clubs. Im-
plicit in the Cour de Cassation decision was the notion that a
book is a book and that, because the books that were distributed
through book clubs were usually still available in bookstores,
both channels competed in the market for the same books. The
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Cour de Cassation had a difficult time distinguishing between
the content of what was being sold and the service being offered
by the retailers. When an Appeals Court decision is overturned
by the Cour de Cassation, the case usually goes back for retrial to
a Court of Appeals different from the one which handed down
the first judgment. In competition cases, however, because the
Paris Court of Appeals has national jurisdiction, the case goes
back to the same Court of Appeals, but with a different panel of
judges. When the book club case went back to the Paris Court of
Appeals, the court confirmed its initial appraisal of the relevant
markets, thereby "rebelling" against the Cour de Cassation. It
eliminated the fines that had been imposed on France-Loisirs
for having abused its dominant position, thereby undercutting
France-Loisirs' incentive to take the case back to the Cour de
Cassation. 21
D. Relevant Markets for the Press
The Conseil, like its predecessor, the Commission de la
Concurrence, has tended to define newspaper markets narrowly
by exploring the various dimensions of the specific information
service provided to readers. These dimensions include the na-
ture of the information, its packaging, the medium by which it is
provided, the editorial policy of the provider, and the geographi-
cal dimension of the information. It has also defined markets
for advertising space.
1. Readership Markets
In a 1986 opinion concerning potential abuses of dominant
position by daily newspapers, the Commission de la Concur-
rence had to assess under what conditions the fact that a daily
regional or national newspaper sold its local editions at different
prices would be a violation of the competition statutes. The rea-
soning given by the Commission in its opinion was that price
differentiation between local editions of a regional or national
newspaper was not per se prohibited, but would be subjected to
a rule of reason analysis. The Commission added that, if the
newspaper was found to have a dominant position and if the
21. Had France-Loisirs taken its case again to the Supreme Court, after the "rebel-
lion" of the Court of Appeals, and had the Supreme Court confirmed its position, that
position would have been binding on the Court of Appeals.
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price differentiation strategy had an exclusionary object or effect
locally, it could indeed constitute a violation of the competition
law.
In its opinion, the Commission stated that radio news bulle-
tins or television newscasts could not be considered to be substi-
tutable for printed news. Although the Commission did not ex-
clude the possibility that in the future these services might be-
come more substitutable, it based its opinion on the situation
prevailing at the time it was delivering its opinion. Two consid-
erations helped shape the opinion of the Commission: the fact
that conditions governing the public use of newspapers were
more flexible than conditions required for using news bulletins
or newscasts and the fact that marketing studies showed that sev-
enty percent of French newspaper readers felt. the need to read a
newspaper after having learned about a news item through an-
other medium because they judged the information provided by
newpapers to be more detailed than that provided by other me-
dia. The Commission also stated that the regional or local press
were not in the same market as the national press because local
newspapers dealt primarily with different issues and events than
those reported in national newspapers. Finally, the Commission
stated that each local edition of a regional or national newspa-
per was in a different geographical market than the other local
editions of the same newspaper.
In 1993, the Conseil had to define the relevant markets
when it examined the acquisition of S.E.B.D.O., the publisher of
a national weekly news magazine called Le Point, by the group
General Occidentale, publisher of a number of magazines, in-
cluding a national weekly news magazine called l'Express.2 2 One
of the central questions in the case was whether this merger met
the merger control market share threshold of twenty-five per-
cent of a relevant market. The parties to the merger alleged that
the relevant market encompassed all the daily, weekly, or
monthly publications dealing with general and national news.
The Conseil disagreed. Regarding the readership market, the
Conseil decided that general news publications could be differ-
22. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour l'annre 1993, An-
nexe 80 at 520, Avis No. 93-A-13 en date du 6juillet 1993 relatif A la prise de participa-
tion de la Socit6 Gnrale Occidentale dans le capital de la socitE d'exploitation de
I'hebdomadaire Le Point.
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entiated according to the type of editorial policy they follow,
their periodicity, their commercial strategy, and their pricing
strategy. Thus, for the Conseil, general weekly news magazines
were a differentiated set and no general news magazine was
strictly substitutable for another. The Conseil also decided, how-
ever, that within this differentiated set, general weekly news
magazines that have similar editorial policies and a similar type
of readership could be deemed direct competitors and should
be included in the same market. Using these criteria, the Con-
seil then established that the relevant market was defined by a
set of six weekly magazines.23
2. Relevant Markets for Advertising Space
In an opinion delivered in 1986, the Commission de la Con-
currence had to analyze whether the pricing policy for advertis-
ing space followed by O.I.P., the publisher of a free paper com-
prised exclusively of commercial and personal ads and distrib-
uted in a number of small towns in the south of France, qualified
as an abuse of its dominant position.24 It was alleged that, when-
ever a free publication was launched in a local area where O.I.P.
was not present, O.I.P. would launch its own local free paper in
the same area and slash the prices it charged for personal or
commercial ads compared to the price it charged in areas in
which it had no competitors, thereby driving its competitors out
of business. The available data showed that the prices charged
for advertising in areas in which a competitor existed were four
to fifteen times cheaper than the prices charged in areas where
O.I.P. had no competitors. In defining the relevant markets, the
Commission de la Concurrence stated that advertising in free
papers was, for the advertisers, neither substitutable for advertis-
ing in regular newspapers in the same area nor substitutable for
advertising in free papers in other areas. The Commission held
that most advertising in free papers was for local goods or serv-
ices providers, such as local butchers or plumbers. The fact that
these papers were distributed free-of-charge in local shops or
public places meant that their readership was largely local and
23. The six weekly magazines were L'Express, Le Point, Le Nouvel Observateur, L'
Ev~nement dujeudi, T6l6rama, and Le Figaro.
24. Commission de la concurrence, D. 1986, Rapport de la Commission de la con-
currence pour l'anne 1986, Annexe 7 at 51, Avis relatif A la situation de la concurrence
dans le secteur de la presse gratuite en region Provence-Alpes-C6te D'Azur.
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altogether different from the -readership of regular newspapers.
Several marketing studies indicated that, for advertisers, advertis-
ing in free papers was, if anything, complementary to, rather
than substitutable for, advertising in newspapers. Having thus
defined the relevant markets, the Commission de la Concur-
rence then decided that O.I.P., which held a dominant position
in a number of local markets for free advertising publications,25
had abused its dominant position by deliberately trying to ex-
clude competitors in other local areas through selective price
slashing for commercial and personal advertisements in those ar-
eas and then increasing its prices once the competitor had been
eliminated.
In the previously mentioned case of the acquisition of
S.E.B.D.O., the publisher of a national weekly news magazine
called Le Point, by the group Occidentale, publisher of a
number of magazines including a national weekly news maga-
zine called l'Express, 26 the Conseil noted that, for any medium,
the boundaries of the relevant readership market are not neces-
sarily the same as the boundaries of the relevant advertising
space market. The Conseil decided that, from the standpoint of
the advertising space market, newspapers were not substitutable
for news magazines for several reasons, including technical dif-
ferences such as paper quality and the use of color. To deter-
mine whether two news magazines were substitutable for adver-
tisers, the Conseil decided that a useful indicator would be the
frequency with which the same brands were advertised in both
news magazines. It should be noted, however, that the use of
such a criterion can be ambiguous to the extent that it does not
properly distinguish between complementary and substitutable
publications for advertisers. In any case, the Conseil set a thresh-
old level of twenty-five percent of common advertisers to distin-
guish between substitutable and non-substitutable news
magazines for advertisers. Observing, for example, that 325 of
the 792 brands that advertised in L'Express also advertised in Le
25. The Commission de la Concurrence noted among other things that O.I.P. had
a leadership position in the southern region of Alpes Provence C6te d'Azur by publish-
ing 19 free local advertising papers with a total of 1.1 million copies weekly.
26. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour l'ann6e 1993, An-
nexe 80 at 520, Avis No. 93-A-13 en date du 6juillet 1993 relatif a la prise de participa-
tion de la Soci6tE G~n~rale Occidentale dans le capital de la soci6t6 d'exploitation de
l'hebdomadaire Le Point.
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Point and that forty-one percent were common advertisers, the
Conseil declared that the two news magazines belonged to the
same advertising space market. Using this criterion, the Conseil
eventually declared that, from the point of view of the relevant
advertising space market, seven news magazines belonged to the
same market. It is interesting to note that, from an advertising
point of view, l'Expansion, a primarily economic bimonthly mag-
azine, was considered to be substitutable for weekly news
magazines when defining the relevant market from an advertis-
ing point of view, but it was not considered to be substitutable
for these news magazines from a readership point of view.
II. COMPETITION ISSUES AND BROADCASTING RIGHTS
A number of cases brought before the Conseil raised issues
related to the acquisition, sale, or sublicensing of broadcasting
rights for films or sports events. The ability to broadcast sports
events, particularly soccer, or films is crucial to the success of
general purpose commercial television stations due to the large
audiences they guarantee and, as a result, the advertising reve-
nues they allow television operators to receive. In addition, as
was mentioned earlier in the case of film broadcasting, television
stations face regulatory contraints making it compulsory for
them to broadcast a minimum quota of French-made fictional
programs, including films, in their global film programming.
Thus, the allocation of broadcasting rights for films and sports
events is crucial in a country where the television sector was
opened to competition only as recently as the 1980s. Three
characteristics concerning the broadcasting rights of films and
sports events are worth noting because they may lead to competi-
tion problems: most of the rights are sold on an exclusive basis,
some of the rights are jointly sold, for example by a sports feder-
ation for a given number of games, and some of the rights are
jointly bought, for example, by a broadcasting rights purchasing
pool of television stations. The competition issues linked to tele-
vision broadcasting rights transactions are all the more compli-
cated because, in the case of international sports events which
frequently draw the largest audiences, the negotiations over such
rights may involve international organizations, including inter-
national sports federations or international television station
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pools, over which a national competition agency may not have
jurisdiction.
In the cases dealt with by the Conseil, it was not the exclusiv-
ity of the rights that was challenged. Challenges to grants of ex-
clusive broadcasting rights for specific films or sports events
based upon the fact that exclusivity restrains competition would
probably not be easily successful in France because the Conseil
and the Paris Court of Appeals generally tend to take a more
lenient attitude towards vertical restrictions than does the Euro-
pean Commission. The way the Conseil dealt with such a case
concerning the acquisition of book publishing rights suggests
that it may be possible to challenge the scope of an exclusivity
clause used in the acquisition of television broadcast rights, par-
ticularly if the clause applies to several distinct media markets. 27
In this decision, although the Conseil fell short of deciding that
exclusivity clauses in the sale of copyrights to a publishing firm
having a dominant position are per se prohibited by Article 7 of
the ordinance, it expressed concern that, if too broadly
designed, such clauses could be used by the purchasers of the
rights to restrict competition in adjacent markets.
We have already seen that the Conseil has determined that a
specific market exists for book clubs and that in this market one
of the three book clubs active on the French market, France-
Loisirs, had a dominant position. It should also be mentioned
that a specific regulation allows resale price maintenance for the
distribution of books.2' For a period of two years bookstores
must abide by the resale price indicated by the publisher at the
time of publication. Book clubs buying the publication rights
for a book to be sold to their subscribers are granted more flexi-
bility, however. For a period of nine months following initial
publication, book clubs cannot sell the book at a price lower
than the bookstore resale price set by the publisher. During this
nine month period book clubs may offer bonuses or free gifts to
their subscribers for the purchase of the book, however. The life
of a published book has three phases. The first phase covers the
nine month period during which there are no more than two
27. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'anne 1989, An-
nexe 48 at 139, Dcision No. 89-D-41 relative a la situation de la concurrence dans le
secteur de la vente de livres par clubs.
28. Loi No. 81-766 du 10 a6ut 1981 relative au prix du livre.
1998] 697
698 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:679
editions of the book on the market: the original edition sold in
bookstores at the price set by the publisher and the edition for
which the book club acquired publication rights during the first
phase. This book club edition is also sold at the price set by the
publisher, with the possibility of a bonus for club members. The
second phase covers the time between the ninth month and the
twenty-fourth month after initial release of the book during
which three editions of the book may be simultaneously offered:
the original edition sold through bookstores at the price origi-
nally set by the publisher, the remaining copies of the edition
distributed by the book club that purchased rights for the first
phase, sold at a discount, and the edition sold at any price put
on sale by another book club that purchased the rights for the
second phase. The third phase concerns the time after the
twenty-fourth month when four editions of the same book can
be sold simultaneously: the original edition sold through book-
stores and possibly discounted, the remaining copies of the two
editions distributed by two different book club publishers, and
possibly a cheap paperback edition of the book.
France-Loisirs, for ,example, generally operates during the
second phase, securing the publishing rights to books for the
period beginning nine months after the original publisher's edi-
tion comes out and selling the books at discounted prices. Its
main competitor, Le Grand Livre du Mois, operates during the
first phase, securing the publication rights to books for the first
nine months after their initial release and selling the books to
club members at the price set by the publisher while granting
club members bonuses for book purchases. In this context,
France-Loisirs, while purchasing the exclusive publishing rights
to a book for the second phase, used its dominant position to
impose clauses prohibiting publishers from allowing sales of the
book through any other outlet at prices inferior to the original
price of the book during the exclusivity period. This meant,
among other things, that the publisher could not permit a first
phase book club to offer a discount on its remaining stock of
books and that it could not sell the publishing rights for a paper-
back edition during France-Loisirs' exclusivity period.
The Conseil decided that the exclusivity clauses that France-
Loisirs was able to impose as result of its dominant position in
the book club market, were designed to shelter France-Loisirs.
from price competition both by direct competitors, such as other
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book clubs and by competitors in adjacent markets; such as pa-
perback publishers. The Conseil, deciding that France-Loisirs'
exclusivity clauses had the purpose and effect of hampering the
development of competition, fined France-Loisirs and required
that the exclusivity clauses in its contracts be restricted to book
publication by book clubs. In so doing, the Conseil strictly lim-
ited exclusivity clauses for publishing rights. When the scope of
such clauses was such that they actually interfered with the possi-
bility of publishing a book, either at a different period than the
one covered by the exclusivity period or at the same period but
in a different form, the clauses reduced competition and were in
violation of Article 7 of the Ordinance. It remains to be seen,
whether the Conseil will take the same approach when con-
fronted by situations in which exclusivity clauses cover broadcast
rights for several adjacent television markets, such as pay-televi-
sion and pay-per-view television.
An issue not yet dealt with by the Conseil is whether the
acquisition by a media firm of exclusive rights for a large
number of films or sports events, or the refusal to sublicense
such a catalogue to competitors would in itself fall within the
ambit of the Ordinance. The available evidence suggests that, in
at least one case, the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Minis-
ter of Culture who make the final determination on media merg-
ers have allowed the purchase by the only pay-television operator
of a firm owning the broadcast rights to the vast majority of
French films. The subsequent alleged refusal of this pay-televi-
sion operator to sublicense its broadcast rights to a pay-per-view
television operator is, however, presently being challenged in
front of the Conseil as an abuse of its dominant position.
The question of whetherjoint sales of broadcasting rights by
a set of sports clubs constitutes a violation of French competition.
law remains an open question. In some European jurisdictions
such joint sales agreements are considered to be contrary to
competition law. While one may agree that the joint sale of
rights may restrict competition among sports teams in the broad-
casting rights market, the question is whether, in a country like
France where anticompetitive practices having efficiency-en-
hancing properties can benefit from an exemption, joint sales of
broadcasting rights could qualify for such an exemption. It is
likely thatjoint sales of rights would allow a smaller team to raise
more money than it could raise if it had to sell its rights solely by
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its own efforts. Some have argued that this is a distributional
effect which should not be taken into consideration by competi-
tion authorities. Some others, including the author of this pa-
per, believe that the fact that smaller teams may raise more
money through joint sales of their rights than without such joint
sales agreements cannot be reduced to a distributional issue. In-
deed, money is necessary to allow teams to perform better, for
example, by hiring better players. Thus a practice allowing
smaller teams better access to more resources than they would
otherwise have makes such teams better able to compete with
other teams and results in more interesting games because teams
thus become more balanced. In other words, the joint sale of
rights to a sports event by a federation of nine sports teams, to
the extent that it allows smaller teams to increase the quality of
their teams, changes the quality of the competition among the
teams concerned and increases benefits to spectators, thus re-
sulting in efficiency value.
The debate over broadcasting rights transactions in France
has focused on the collective behavior of members of pools ac-
quiring such rights or on the collective behavior of the owners of
such rights. The main issue in most of the cases has been
whether the more-established television stations with the largest
audiences, including the three television stations created when
the French public broadcasting monopoly was abolished at the
beginning of the 1980s, engaged in concerted actions with rights
owners or organizations representing them and used their col-
lective market power to prevent newly-established commercial
television stations from gaining access on fair and non-discrimi-
natory terms to broadcast rights for films or sports events that
would allow them to effectively compete with more-established
television stations. The Conseil examined the operation of
purchasing pools of television broadcast rights in three deci-
sions.29 These three decisions resulted from complaints by a tel-
29. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1989, An-
nexe 64 at 188, Decision No. 89-MC-13 relative A une demande de mesures conserva-
toires pr6sentie par la Soci6t6 La Cinq S.A.; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1991, Rap-
port annuel pour l'ann6e 1991, Annexe 18 at 42, D6cision No. 91-D-11 en date du 19
mars 1991 concernant les Organismes frangais de radiodiffusion et t616vision
(O.F.R.T.); Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1991, Rapport annuel pour I'anne 1991,
Annexe 72 at 166, Dcision No. 91-MC-05 en date du 19 novembre 1991 relative A une
demande de mesures conservatoires pr6sent6e par la Soci6t6 La Cinq S.A.
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evision station, La Cinq S.A., 30 that it had experienced difficul-
ties in obtaining broadcast rights for major sports or entertain-
ment events due to anticompetitive practices by the French
Soccer Federation ("FFF") and by an association of formerly
public television and radio stations, the Office de radiodiffusion
et de T6levision Franaise.
Concerning the sale of broadcast rights to international soc-
cer games, La Cinq alleged that the FFF systematically refused to
grant it sub-licenses for the broadcast rights to soccer games or-
ganized by the U.E.F.A., an association of European national soc-
cer federations based in Switzerland of which the FFF was a
member. The U.E.F.A. organizes international soccer competi-
tions. According to Article 14 of the U.E.F.A. bylaws, the
U.E.F.A., its national federation members, and participating Eu-
ropean clubs own the radio and television broadcast rights for
the international soccer games it organizes. Article 14 of the
U.E.F.A. bylaws also provides that the broadcast rights to a game
owned either by a home team or by that team's national soccer
federation can be sold to a television station from another coun-
try only if the national federation of the country in which the
television station is located allows the broadcast in that country.
The rationale for such a provision is easy to understand
from the point of view of national soccer federations. In several
European countries, the national soccer federation owns the
game broadcasting rights for the competitions it organizes.
These rights are often sold on an exclusive basis to a national
television station or to a consortium of national television sta-
tions. If international competitions are also broadcast in a given
country outside of any control by the national soccer federation,
there is a risk that spectators will be less willing to attend local
games organized by the national federation or to watch such
games on television. As a result, international games may com-
pete for television audiences with national games. Allowing the
broadcasting of international games may decrease the value of
broadcast rights for domestic games organized by national feder-
ations. The FFF's desire to protect the value of the broadcast
30. La Cinq S.A. was the first privately-owned free terrestrial television station to
obtain a license when the state television broadcasting monopoly was abolished at the
beginning of the 1980s. La Cinq, created in 1985, had obtained authorization to broad-
cast nationally in France but, at the time of its referral to the Conseil in 1991, La Cinq's
broadcasts were not yet received everywhere in the country.
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rights of the soccer games it organizes explains, but does not
necessarily justify, the restrictive policy the FFF adopted towards
the demands of television stations like La Cinq. This restrictive
policy was overt, as emphasized by the President of the FFF in
1991 in an interview in which he explained that, in the future,
broadcasting rights would not be granted to La Cinq for
U.E.F.A.-sponsored games. As La Cinq did not have a contract
with the FFF for domestic soccer game broadcast rights, the
FFF's systematic refusal to allow La Cinq to broadcast interna-
tional games organized by the U.E.F.A. pretty much eliminated
La Cinq from soccer broadcasting, despite the fact that soccer is
an immensely popular, sport throughout France, drawing large
television audiences, and therefore allowing soccer-broadcasting
television stations to attract significant advertising revenues.
In 1991, La Cinq filed a complaint with the European Com-
mission arguing that Article 14 of the U.E.F.A. statute consti-
tuted a violation of Articles 85 and 86 of the European Union
treaty. Simultaneously, La Cinq referred the case to the Conseil,
arguing that FFF's behavior also constituted a violation of Arti-
cles 7 and 8 of the Ordinance. La Cinq asked the Conseil to
grant a temporary injunction forcing the FFF to stop its discrimi-
natory practices and requiring the FFF to grant La Cinq access
under clear rules to U.E.F.A. soccer game broadcasting rights.
The Conseil decided that it would undertake a full-fledged inves-
tigation of the case because the preliminary evidence presented
by La Cinq was sufficient to suggest that the FFF's attitude could
constitute a violation of French competition law. The Conseil
decided, however, that the restrictive legal conditions under
which it could grant a temporary injunction were not satisfied
because La Cinq had not established that it had suffered irrepa-
rable harm.
Although the Conseil never completed its substantive inves-
tigation due to the fact that, for unrelated reasons, La Cinq went
out of business before the end of the legal proceedings, one may
wonder, given subsequent legal developments concerning the
applicability of French competition law to sports bodies, if the
Conseil, in spite of its initial ruling, or the Paris Court of Appeals
would have had to declare that the behavior of the FFF was
outside the scope of the Ordinance. The FFF argued that, like
other similar sports bodies, it was entrusted by law with public
service obligations related to soccer promotion in France and
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that in this capacity it had to make sure that enough resources
would be available to maintain local teams and to attract soccer
game spectators. It contended that the management of televi-
sion broadcast rights for soccer games, whether in the context of
competitions organized by the FFF or in the context of interna-
tional competitions for which the FFF had the right to authorize
or refuse broadcast rights, was an integral part of the FFF's pub-
lic service obligations and thus exempt from competition law.
Although both the Conseil and the Paris Court of Appeals
have resisted this extensive interpretation of the role of sports
bodies, it should be noted that a special court, the Tribunal des
Conflits, composed of Supreme Civil Court and Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court judges having the final determination in such
issues, has adhered to a broad interpretation of the public ser-
vice obligations of sports federations. The Tribunal des Conflits
has decided that decisions on their part regarding the negotia-
tion of collective sponsoring agreements or the choice of com-
puter systems to be used for ticketing at all stadium gates, for
example, fall within the ambit of sports federations' public ser-
vice obligations. It is possible that this court would also consider
the management of radio and television broadcast rights by such
organizations to be part of their public service obligations. On
this point there is thus the possibility of a conflict between
French national law and European law.
In 1989, two years before it referred the U.E.F.A. broadcast
rights case to the Conseil, La Cinq lodged another complaint
concerning access to major international sports event broadcast-
ing rights for worldwide events such as the Olympic Games or
World Cups. Organizers negotiate the broadcast rights for such
events through the European Broadcasting Union ("EBU"), a
pool of the major television stations in Europe and the Mediter-
anean area. As of 1990, thirty-nine members from thirty-two
countries were part of the EBU. The active members of the EBU
are national television station pools that are themselves mem-
bers of the EBU. In the case of France, for example, OFRT, an
association of the major French television stations, is an active
member of the EBU. When it was created in 1983, the OFRT
originally regrouped only TF 1, A2, and FR3, the three television
stations that were created as a result of the dismantling of the
former French state television monopoly. Its membership was
subsequently enlarged to include three newly-authorized private
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channels, Canal + in 1984 and La Cinq and M6 in 1987. Among
French television stations, TF I, A2, FR3, and Canal + were mem-
bers of the EBU via the OFRT, but although La Cinq and M6
were OFRT members, neither one was accepted as a member by
the EBU.
The negotiations of the broadcasting rights for an interna-
tional sports event were conducted globally by the EBU with the
organizers of the event after each national pool had indicated
under what financial conditions its members would be willing to
bid for the broadcasting rights to the event. If the negotiations
were successful, all the television stations that were EBU mem-
bers of the national pools that had participated in the bidding
process collectively owned the exclusive right to broadcast the
event in Europe. La Cinq and M6 could not bid for rights
through the EBU pool because La Cinq and M6 were not mem-
bers of the EBU, in spite of the fact that they were members of
OFRT. Unlike EBU members, they were at liberty to join an-
other international pool competing with the EBU for acquisition
of the rights of an event. The chances of another pool getting
the exclusive rights to broadcast a major sports event in Europe
were slim, however, due to the large size of the EBU pool and
because its members consisted of the longest-established and the
most important national television stations. In addition, the fact
that La Cinq and M6 were newly established in 1985, and were
not yet broadcasting everywhere in France made them relatively
unattractive prospects for major sports events organizers because
organizers of such events tend to try to maximize their total reve-
nues by means of a combination of the sale of broadcasting
rights and of sponsoring contracts. Organizers of major events
tend to prefer contracting with the more-established television
stations that are EBU members because the value of a sponsor-
ing contract is dependent on the television coverage of the event
and the television coverage of the event depends on the ability
of the television stations to broadcast throughout a country.
This situation did not create a major problem for M6, which was
primarily a music channel, but it did hamper the development
prospects of La Cinq, which was a general purpose channel.
While acting at the European level to challenge its non-admis-
sion to the EBU as a breach of Articles 85 and 86, La Cinq tried
to negotiate with OFRT regarding the possibility of purchasing
from OFRT members broadcasting rights they had themselves
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purchased or were likely to purchase through the EBU process.
Such a possibility did not exist before 1987 because EBU mem-
bers were until then prohibited from reselling the rights they
had purchased to non-EBU members. This became possible in
1987 after the negotiation of a contract between OFRT and EBU
that set the conditions under which OFRT or its EBU members
could resell their rights to an OFRT member who was not a
member of EBU.
At the beginning of the 1990s, sports event broadcasting
represented between 2.5% and 10% of the total programming
time of each channel. In 1989, the rights for half of the sports
events broadcast on French television had been purchased
through the EBU. These events represented 72.5% of sports
broadcast by A2, 64% of sports broadcast by T.F.I. and 31.5% of
sports broadcast by FR3, but only 1.6% of sports broadcast by La
Cinq. The latter figure demonstrates the difficulty experienced
by La Cinq in obtaining rights from EBU members. In 1989 La
Cinq filed a complaint with the Conseil concerning three clauses
of the operating rules adopted in 1987 by OFRT. La Cinq con-
sidered these clauses discriminatory, anticompetitive, and
designed to keep La Cinq from gaining access to sports events
broadcasting. The first of these clauses stated that OFRT mem-
bers agreed that television stations that had been OFRT and
EBU members before the date when new members were ac-
cepted by these two organizations would be given priority for
broadcasting sports events whose rights had been purchased
through the EBU prior to the admission date for the new mem-
bers. The clause also stated that the same principle would apply
for five years following the admission of new members to OFRT
and EBU for a number of important international sports events,
including World Cup Soccer. The second clause stated that
OFRT members admitted before June 22, 1987 would be given
priority for broadcasting national soccer competitions for a pe-
riod of five years until June 1992. The third clause made it
mandatory for OFRT and EBU members to negotiate an agree-
ment among themselves to share the rights of international
events obtained through the EBU.
The Conseil's decision noted that the first clause was
designed to discriminate against La Cinq if it gained admission
to the EBU and reflected the worries of other OFRT members
concerning the La Cinq legal challenge of EBU admission rules
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at the European Commission level. Indeed, if that challenge
were sucessful and if La Cinq were recognized as an EBU mem-
ber, the OFRT operating rules clause would ensure that La Cinq
could not claim that it had a right, on an equal footing with
other members of OFRT and EBU, to broadcast the events for
which the EBU had secured the broadcast rights previous to La
Cinq's admission. It also ensured that for five years following La
Cinq's admission, the other OFRT and EBU members would not
have to negotiate shared rights for new events with la Cinq, but
would be able to negotiate among themselves and leave to La
Cinq only those events or parts of events that they did not want
to broadcast. Along the same lines, the second clause ensured
that for a period of five years the most established channels,
which were the older members' of OFRT, would get preferential
access to broadcast rights for French soccer matches not negoti-
ated through the EBU. In practice, this meant that during this
five year period, La Cinq, because it was a member of OFRT and
therefore had to abide by its operating rules, was forbidden from,
bidding competitively against any of the older members of
OFRT to secure the exclusive broadcast rights to French soccer
matches. As far as the third clause was concerned, La Cinq ar-
gued that either it was an illegal market sharing agreement that
the Conseil should prohibit or that, if the clause was considered
legal, La Cinq should be permitted to participate on an equal
footing with EBU members in negotiations on shared rights se-
cured through the EBU because it could, at least in principle,
purchase such rights from its competitors.
In its decision, the Conseil decided that the first two clauses
were obviously designed to discriminate anticompetitively
against newly-established channels and had the effect of prevent-
ing them from gaining access to broadcast rights for important
national and international sports events. The Conseil did not
agree with the OFRT's view that this anticompetitive clause
should be exempt under Article 10 of the Ordinance because it
contributed to economic progress by ensuring that principal
sports events would be broadcast by television channels through-
out the country. The OFRT was fined 100,000 Francs. The Con-
seil did not, however, rule on the last clause.
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III. PERFORMANCE RIGHTS AND COMPETITION
The negotiation of performance rights is often conducted
collectively. In certain circumstances, labor unions representing
actors negotiate those actors' performance rights. Predomi-
nantly monopolistic performance societies usually set perform-
ance rights for musicians or composers.
Two sets of issues have been raised concerning the manage-
ment of performance rights. In 1990, the Conseil decided a col-
lective boycott case arising from a labor dispute between per-
forming artists' trade unions, the major television stations, and
the producers of films made for television.31 One of the issues in
this case was whether a labor settlement arrived at through col-
lective bargaining could fall within the ambit of competition law
provisions prohibiting anticompetitive agreements even though
such agreements were admissible from the standpoint of labor
law. The Conseil, supported by the Paris Court of Appeals, de-
cided that, if labor law allowed unions to engage with employers
in collective bargaining of labor agreements, it did not allow
them to negotiate agreements which had the purpose or could
have the effect of restraining competition in a product or service
market. While the Conseil did not challenge the fact that the
actors had collectively negotiated their rights with television pro-
ducers and broadcasters through their unions, it examined
whether the resultant agreement restricted competition in the
television market.
A second set of cases concerning performance rights socie-
ties collecting royalties and distributing them to their members
arose from a conflict between SACEM, the French performance
rights society for composers, music performers, and discothe-
32ques. Two questions were discussed in this second set of cases:
whether SACEM had abused its dominant position by charging
31. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1990, Rapport annuel pour l'annfe 1990, An-
nexe 28 at 73, Dcision No. 90-D-21 relative aux accords conclus entre des syndicats
d'artistes-interpr~tes, des organismes de communication audiovisuelle, et certains
producteurs d'&missions de t~lfvision.
32. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1994, Rapport annuel pour l'annfe 1994, An-
nexe 87 at 591, Avis No. 94-A-07 relatif A des questions pos~es par M. Maureille, juge
d'instruction pros le tribunal de grande instance de Dijon dans le cadre de plaintes avec
constitution de partie civile d~pos~e par la Soci& Sog~dis, la Socikt Kiss et la S.A.R.L.
White Horse Club; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour 'anne
1989, Annexe 31 at 81, Dcision No. 89-D-24 relative a des pratiques de la S.D.R.M. en
mati~re de fixation du taux de la redevance phonographique. A number of similar
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excessively high prices and whether it had engaged in unlawful
discrimination. What was not discussed was whether SACEM, a
collective organization that sets and collects royalties on behalf
of musical authors and composers, in itself constituted an an-
ticompetitive cartel. In all likelihood, had this question been
raised, the Conseil would have decided that the collective setting
of royalties by authors and composers did indeed constitute an
agreement restraining competition among authors and compos-
ers of music, but it probably would also have decided that, due to
the transaction costs that individual authors or composers would
have to face if they tried to collect their rights individually, this
collective agreement could benefit from the economic exemp-
tion provided for anticompetitive agreements that contribute to
economic progress.
The particulars of the first case are complex, requiring
some explanation of various aspects of the regulatory environ-
ment for television in France and of French labor law. Televi-
sion operators must be licensed to operate in France. Licenses
are granted by the Conseil Suprieur de l'Audiovisuel ("CSA"), a
regulatory body analogous to the Federal Communications Com-
mission in the United States. The CSA can impose specific obli-
gations on each licensed television operator. All television oper-
ators, however, are subject to a common obligation to allot a cer-
tain proportion of their overall programming to French-made
fiction program broadcasting. To meet this obligation, televi-
sion operators may choose among three solutions: to contribute
financially to the production of new French-made fiction pro-
grams whose broadcast rights they will own, to purchase the
rights of newly-made French fictional programs, or to re-broad-
cast older French-made fiction programs. Smaller television op-
erators tend to rely heavily on purchasing from larger television
operators the re-broadcast rights for old French-made television
programs that they then rebroadcast a second or third time to
meet their quotas because the production of new fiction pro-
grams and the purchase of rights to newly-made fiction pro-
grams are expensive propositions. Thus, a larger proportion of
reruns of older French-made fiction television programs will typ-
ically be shown by smaller television operators than by the major
opinions were also delivered on this subject in 1993 by the Conseil at the request of
other judges. These opinions have not been published, however.
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television stations. At the time the Conseil rendered its decision,
three channels were the major operators on the French televi-
sion scene and four private channels were the newly-established
challengers. Regarding the labor dispute involved in the case, it
should be noted that, except in certain cases, labor agreements
apply only to the signatories of such agreements and that sepa-
rate negotiations are Conducted between national labor unions
and each firm.
In 1988, a labor conflict arose between the actors' unions
on the one hand, and the producers of films and television oper-
ators on the other hand, regarding the question of the basis to
be used for computing the residuals that actors were entitled to
receive for the sale of rebroadcast rights of television fiction
films. While the actors insisted that the residuals to which they
were entitled in such cases should be proportionate to the acting
fees that they had originally received for acting in a film or fic-
tional series, the producers and television operators insisted that
the residuals should be proportionate to the price for which the
rebroadcast rights of a film or series had been sold to the
rebroadcaster, the latter position being disadvantageous for the
actors. In February 1988, after a protracted strike, the conflict
was settled between the actors' unions and all of the television
operators except La Cinq and M6 who refused to sign the agree-
ment. The agreement stated that in the case of fictional pro-
gram rebroadcasting, the signatory television operators would
compute the actors' residual rights on the basis of their initial
acting fees and that they would only co-produce with or
purchase re-broadcasting rights from producers who accepted
the settlement, whether or not such producers were parties to
the settlement.
La Cinq and M6 refused to sign the agreement because they
had a much higher proportion of reruns of old French-made
fictional programs in their programming libraries due to the fact
that they did not have the financial means to produce or co-
produce a large number of fiction films or series to meet their
quotas for French-made fictional programs. Therefore, the
agreement proposed by the actors' unions had much greater fi-
nancial implications for them than it had for television operators
using few reruns in their programming. Although to meet their
future quotas of French made fictional programs, La Cinq and
M6 would have to purchase the broadcast rights for some feature
710 FORDHAMINTERATATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol.21:679
films or fictional series produced either by other television oper-
ators or by producers abiding by the settlement agreement, they
still could produce their own films with non-union actors or
purchase the rights to old or new films from producers not party
to the agreement. This partial means of escape did not satisfy
the actors' unions who wanted to force La Cinq and M6 to sign
the agreement. They feared that, due to widespread unemploy-
ment in the acting profession and a lack of union membership
on the part of a certain number of actors, some actors would
indeed be willing to play in non-union films produced by one of
these two television operators. Having settled their own labor
dispute with the actors, the main competitors of these two televi-
sion operators were only too glad to help the actors' unions
force La Cinq and M6 to sign a similar agreement because this
would increase the costs of La Cinq and M6 proportionately
more than their own costs were likely to be increased by the set-
tlement. Therefore, while the actors' unions had their own in-
terest in forcing the two remaining non-signatory television op-
erators to sign the agreement, other television operators were
interested in weakening the competitive position of La Cinq and
M6 also. To achieve that goal, the television operators who had
settled with the actors' union agreed to sign an addendum to the
labor agreement whereby they would refuse to sell any rebroad-
cast rights for French-made feature films or fictional series to La
Cinq and M6 as long as these two operators did not settle with
the actors' unions. By establishing a collective boycott on the
part of the actors' unions and the major television operators
against La Cinq and M6, this addendum deprived the two televi-
sion operators of any flexibility because it was clear that they did
not have the means to independently produce enough feature
films or fictional series to fulfill their programming quotas for
French-made works. The signing of this addendum to the labor
settlement by the major television operators and the actors' un-
ions forced La Cinq and M6 to capitulate and promptly settle
with the actors' unions.
The Conseil held that the collective boycott agreement
against La Cinq and M6 violated the prohibition against an-
ticompetitive cartels and fined the three major television opera-
tors as well as the other signatories, the producers' union, and
three actor's unions. In so doing, the Conseil decided that labor
unions could not, in the context of exercising their legitimate,
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constitutionally protected rights, conspire with third parties to
enter into anticompetitive agreements prohibited by competi-
tion law. This decision led to a passionate debate in French legal
journals regarding the respective limits of competition law and
labor law, in addition to debates as to whether competition law
could apply to collective actions initiated by labor unions in the
context of labor disputes. The Paris Court of Appeals upheld
the decision of the Conseil although it decided that no pecuni-
ary sanction should be imposed on the labor unions.
. The second set of cases referred to above arose from a long-
lasting conflict between SACEM, the monopolistic performance
rights organization for authors and composers of music, and dis-
cotheques. The discotheques argued that the royalty imposed
on them for performing music of 8.5% of their receipts, includ-
ing tips, was abusively high, that SACEM discriminated unfairly
among different categories of discotheques, and that SACEM re-
fused, without objective justification, licenses for the only cate-
gory of music in which they were interested. Since the end of
the. 1970s, a number of discotheques refused to take out SACEM
licenses and to pay SACEM royalties, arguing that SACEM was
acting in violation of Article 86 of the European Treaty and Arti-
cle 8 of the Ordinance. When SACEM took the recalcitrant dis-
cotheques to court, a number of national courts referred the
case under Article 177 of the European Treaty to the European
Court of Justice.33 Simultaneously, a number of discotheques
took their cases to the European Commission which refused for
political reasons to make a decision, arguing that the cases did
not present a sufficient Community interest. The European
Court of Justice, acting on the Article 177 referrals from the na-
tional courts, ruled that SACEM's refusal to grant the discothe-
ques licenses for the foreign repertory they requested was not a
restriction of competition unless it was established that such par-
tial licenses could be granted while safeguarding the interests of
composers and without increasing the cost of collection of these
rights.34 The Court also ruled, however, that if an organization
33. Ministire Public v. Tournier, Case 395/87, [1989] E.C.R. 2521, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 248; Sacem v. Lucazeau, Case 110/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2811, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
248; Sacem v. Debelle, Case 241/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2811, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 248; Sacem
v. Soumagnac, Case 242/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2811, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 248.
34. See D.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAw 372-77 (Oxford European Community
Law Series ed., 1992) (commenting on European Court ofJustice rulings on this issue).
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such as SACEM imposed special fees for its services that were
appreciably higher than those imposed by similar organizations
in other European Member States, that difference might itself be
indicative of an abuse of its dominant position, unless the under-
taking could provide a satisfactory justification for the difference
between its fees and the fees charged by similar organizations.
This ruling left the national courts with the task of establishing
whether or not SACEM fees were higher than those charged in
other countries. Unable to undertake this task, the national
courts then referred the case to the Conseil under Article 26 of
the Ordinance which allows the courts to ask the opinion of the
Conseil on practices which may fall within the ambit of Articles 7
and 8 of the Ordinance.
Although the ruling of the European Court of Justice pro-
vides us with a relatively clear standard on the applicability of
Article 86 of the Treaty to the pricing behavior of performance
rights organizations, this ruling suffers from two major draw-
backs: it does not make much sense from an economic stand-
point and it is exceedingly difficult for national courts or na-
tional competition authorities to gather data on the fees im-
posed in other countries because their powers of investigation
are territorially limited. A comparison between two monopolisti-
cally-set fees does not provide us with a benchmark as to what a
competitively-determined fee would be and therefore is of little
use in assessing the presence or the absence of an abuse of domi-
nant position. Furthermore, fees are computed in different
countries on very different bases. Depending on the country,
fees can be be based upon a proportion of a discotheque's total
receipts, upon the surface area of a particular discotheque, or
upon the number of tables in a discotheque. As a result, assum-
ing that data were available, meaningful comparisons would be
of limited value. Nevertheless, the Conseil had no choice but to
apply the methodology suggested by the European Court ofJus-
tice on the basis of data transmitted by the Commission in con-
tradiction with the rule established by the Court of Justice in the
Spanish Bank case. It found that the fees charged by SACEM
were significantly higher than the fees charged by similar organi-
zations in other Member States. Furthermore, the Conseil estab-
lished that the share of the fees distributed to the rights holders
was approximately the same in all other countries, around thirty
percent. As a result, it was established that the cost charged for
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the collection of the fees in France was roughly 2.5 times the cost
charged for collection of fees in other Member States. The Con-
seil held that none of the explanations offered by SACEM tojus-
tify the high cost of fee collection in France was valid.
The Conseil also had to give its opinion as to whether
SACEM had abused its dominant position by discriminating
among discotheques. SACEM had entered several agreements
with professional discotheque organizations representing sev-
enty-five percent of all French discotheques providing that the
members of these organizations could pay reduced fees if they
produced their accounting books spontaneously or if the organi-
zations helped in the collection process. The Conseil held that,
because the help provided by these discotheque trade organiza-
tions clearly reduced the collection costs incurred by SACEM
and because SACEM had never refused to sign similar agree-
ments with other discotheque trade organizations, the grant of a
reduced fee in exchange for these services did not in itself con-
stitute an illegitimate discriminatory practice. The Conseil also
noted that while the fee reductions granted by SACEM to the
organizations with which it had entered into agreements of the
kind described above had increased from ten to fifteen percent
in 1990 without any justification because the obligations of these
organizations had not changed and it was neither alleged nor
established that the collection cost reduction obtained by
SACEM had itself increased in the same proportion, the post-
1990 reduction in fees to these organizations thus appeared un-
justified and discriminatory.
IV. VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN TELEVISION AND FILMS
The issue of the impact on competition of upward vertical
integration in the media sector, particularly with regard to the
film and television sectors, has been the subject of intense con-
troversy in France. This controversy has centered upon the
question of whether firms present at the exhibition level, either
as television operators or cinema owners, should be allowed to
integrate into the production and distribution of film or televi-
sion programs. The debate has been fueled in particular by the
claims of a small but vocal number of independent producers
and distributors claiming that the difficulties they experienced
in gaining access to television or movie screens weakened
1998]
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France's creative potential. In a country traditionally concerned
with the survival of its national culture, these claims have had a
powerful echo. Simultaneously, some of the major integrated
groups in the audiovisual sector have argued that the survival of
the national film industry was crucially dependent on their abil-
ity to produce or distribute French films that they could show on
their screens. They argued that their upward integration guar-
anteed that box office receipts would flow back into film indus-
try financing. They have suggested that it was precisely the lack
of vertical integration between the exhibition level and the pro-
duction and distributions levels that explained the poor per-
formances of film industries in several other European coun-
tries. Although the fact that the French film industry is relatively
healthy is not in dispute, a number of independent film produ-
cers have argued that the films produced by integrated groups
were films with little cultural quality, designed to appeal to the
lowest common denominator. They further argue that such a
result would not occur if these groups were prevented from inte-
grating upward, an argument for which there is no empirical ba-
sis, or if regulatory constraints forced integrated groups to ex-
hibit more culturally ambitious independent films. This debate,
which originally focused on the film industry, has recently also
concerned the television industry because some television opera-
tors, particularly cable television network operators, have ex-
tended their activities to television program production.
While the government has not considered prohibiting verti-
cal integration or horizontal concentration in these industries, it
has tried to placate the criticisms of independent producers and
filmmakers by imposing regulatory constraints on both television
station programming and major film exhibitors to ensure that
independent film or television fiction producers would find an
outlet for their work. In spite of these constraints, which are
more burdensome than effective, the controversy has not
abated.
The issues under debate have less to do with competition
and more to do with ensuring the pluralism of cultural expres-
sion or taking a normative approach to the quality of creative
work, despite the fact that practices of vertically-integrated au-
diovisual groups are often described as anticompetitive viola-
tions of the Ordinance. From the standpoint of competition,
the fundamental issue is whether vertical integration at the dis-
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tribution and the production level of firms controlling movie
theater or television screens is likely to result in decreased con-
sumer welfare. It is commonly argued that such an outcome
could result from the fact that, once integrated upward, large
groups operating television stations or controlling the program-
ming of a number of movie theaters have an incentive to dis-
criminate in favor of showing the films or programs they have
produced or for which they have secured the distribution rights
because they have expended money in such films or programs.
Thus independently-produced films or programs would not get
the chance they deserve to be exhibited or broadcast.
This argument is, at best, a short term argument, however.
In the long run, there are no expended costs. An integrated
profit-maximizing audiovisual group would have an incentive to
leave the production or distribution business if it were not able
to produce or distribute films having as much public appeal, and
therefore as many commercial prospects, as films it could obtain
from independent producers or distributors. For the same rea-
son, such an integrated group would have no incentive to refuse
to exhibit its films in independent movie theaters if these thea-
ters attracted larger audiences than its own theaters. The
counterargument frequently offered to refute this position is
that, in the long term, independent producers or distributors, as
well as independent cinemas, will disappear and presumably will
not be in a position to reenter the industry. Therefore, the long
term elastic supply of independently-produced films is nil or very
low. Unfortunately there is relatively little evidence available on
the technical question raised by this debate, although some
would argue that the disappearance of national film industries in
some European countries testifies to the fact that the long term
elastic supply of independently-produced films is indeed low.
It is in the context of this debate, that the Conseil has dealt
with several cases in which it was alleged that vertical integration
in a media industry, combined with a high level of horizontal
concentration, fostered the adoption of exclusionary anticompe-
titive practices. In a 1991 decision concerning the movie indus-
try, the Conseil described the structural features of this industry
in France." Two major French film groups, Gaumont and UGC,
are simultaneously involved in film production, distribution, and
35. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1991, Rapport annuel pour l'ann&e 1991, An-
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exhibition. The third largest French film group, Path6, does not
directly produce films, but is present at the film distribution and
exhibition levels. Path6 owns shares in several French produc-
tion companies and is thus, at least indirectly, present at all
stages. Together these three groups control, directly or indi-
rectly, the programming of 52% of the movie theaters in Paris
and the movie theaters to which they. distribute take in 71.5% of
the total box office revenues of Parisian movie theaters. They
also have substantial interests outside Paris and control 20% of
all French movie theaters at the national level. The movie thea-
ters they control account for more than 50% of total film box
office revenues in France. The difference between the propor-
tion of movie theaters these groups control and the proportion
of box office revenues they receive from these movie theaters
clearly indicates that they control the most successful movie the-
aters. Besides Gaumont and UGC, three middle size firms, AAA,
AMLF, and MK2, specialize in the distribution and co-produc-
tion of French films. MK2 also owns eighteen movie theaters in
Paris. AMLF belongs to Chargeurs, a financial group that owns
Path6, one of the three vertically-integrated French groups. In
1990, the global market share of these smaller distributors was
about 20%. Finally, the five American majors, Columbia, United
International Pictures, Walt Disney, Twentieth Century Fox, and
Warner Bros., also distribute foreign films in France. Their
global market share at the distribution level was about 50% in
1990.
The commercial success of films in movie theaters is a signif-
icant source of revenues for film distributors because France is a
country of moviegoers. The release of a film follows a precise
pattern. Release in the best movie theaters in Paris and in major
provincial cities is crucial to the commercial success of a film.
Attendance during the first week of a film's release is usually a
good indicator of a film's earning potential. Depending upon a
film's first week's box office receipts, a film will continue to be
shown in the best movie theaters, be moved to less important
movie theaters, or be shown in smaller cities. The planning of
its release is of paramount importance to the distributor who
holds the film's rights because the commercial success of a film
nexe 52 at 109, Dcision No. 91-D-45 en date du 29 octobre 1991 relative A la situation
de la concurrence sur le march6 de 1'exploitation des films dans les salles de cinema.
MEDIA UNDER FRENCH COMPETITION LAW
depends in part on the movie theaters in which it is released.
There are only three movie theater networks through which a
film can be released nationwide, however: Gaumont, UGC, or
Path&. In addition, these networks are controlled by groups that
are directly or indirectly involved in film production and distri-
bution.
Concentration of movie theaters is partly the result of the
regulatory environment that was established to promote the
French movie industry by aJuly 1982 law on the audiovisual sec-
tor. 6 It was decided that the presence of a large number of
commercially successful movie theaters was necessary for the
harmonious and pluralistic development of the industry and that
the commercial success of a movie theater was partly dependent
on its ability to consistently provide movies that appealed to its
customers. Itwas also felt that a number of theater owners were
either unable to get access to films that would ensure the eco-
nomic viability of their movie theaters, due to the vertical inte-
gration of the three major French distributors, or showed poor
judgment in their choice of films and could be tempted to close
down their movie theaters and sell them to real estate developers
because movie theaters are often situated in prime central city
locations. Because the existence of a large number of screens
was perceived to be necessary to provide sufficient outlets for
French-produced films, the prospect that small movie theaters
would be turned into parking lots or apartment buildings was
considered to be a threat to the French film industry.
To accommodate these various constraints, but without con-
sidering the possibility of prohibiting vertical integration be-
tween exhibition and distribution or ordering deconcentration
measures at the exhibition level, a regulatory framework was
designed in 1982 to allow independent movie theater owners to
enter agreements with one or the other of the main film distrib-
utors so that these distributors would, on a regular basis, select
the films to be shown in these movie theaters.3 ' The Director
General of the National Cinematography Center must authorize
36. Loi No. 82-652 du 29 juillet 1982 sur la communication audiovisuelle; D~cret
No. 83-13 du 10 janvier 1983 portant application des dispositions de l'article 90 de
ladite loi et relatif aux groupements et entente de programmation modifi6 par le d~cret
No. 91-1130 du 25 octobre 1991.
37. Loi No. 82-652 du 29juillet 1982 sur la communication audiovisuelle, articles
90 A 92; D~cret No. 83-13 du 10 janvier 1983.
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these agreements after consultation with an administrative com-
mission composed of magistrates, civil servants, and film profes-
sionals and, in particular, representatives of the three major dis-
tributors as well as of independent producers, distributors, and
exhibitors. Once authorized, these agreements are exempt from
competition law. The Director General of the National Cinema-
tography Center tries to maintain a modicum of balance in each
major city between the three movie theater networks controlled
by the major distributors and the independent movie theater
owners not party to any agreement. This scheme obviously al-
lows each of the three major distributors to control a larger
number of movie theaters than it owns outright and therefore
fosters horizontal concentration at the exhibition level..
In order to meet the concerns of the independent movie
theater owners competing with the three cinema networks con-
trolled by the major distributors, local agreements are author-
ized only on the condition that each distributor controlling a
network of movie theaters in that area will make available to
competing independent movie theaters a certain number of po-
tentially successful films throughout the year. This does not pre-
vent conflicts from erupting because the box office appeal of a
film at the time of its release is not always easy to predict and
because the potential of an independent movie theater to attract
moviegoers can also be subject to debate. For these reasons, a
mediator's office was created. A mediator must first examine
any conflict between a theater owner and a distributor before a
case can be referred to the Conseil. This means that the agree-
ments the mediator negotiates do not necessarily meet competi-
tion law standards because the mediator's role is to try to de-
crease tensions rather than to promote competition,
A 1991 case examined by the Conseil originated with a com-
plaint by an independent exhibitor, Mr. Adira, who owned
movie theaters in southeastern France and complained that in-
dependent French distributors as well as the three vertically inte-
grated distributors refused to release films in his movie theaters
and therefore prevented him from competing with the movie
theaters belonging to the three major cinema networks. He con-
tended, for example, that from September 1986 to June 1987, a
period during which a total of ninety-four films were released by
AAA and AMLF, the two largest independent film distributors,
and by Gaumont and UGC, the two largest vertically integrated
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film distributors, he had secured access to only seven of these
films in Lyon, six in Grenoble, and twenty in Chalon sur Saone.
The Conseil established that the reason that Mr. Adira had
difficulty obtaining first run films did not lie with a lack of com-
petitiveness on the part of his movie theaters because independ-
ent distributors acknowledged that his movie theaters had good
commercial potential. The defense presented by the independ-
ent French film distributors was that, in order to release their
films with the best chance of success, they had to release them
through one of the three main cinema networks because these
networks owned or controlled the best movie theaters in Paris.
In return, these networks agreed to release independent films
nationally only under the condition that they not be simultane-
ously released in independent movie theaters competing with
their own movie theaters.
A related issue was the difficulty that another independent
film exhibitor, Mr. Malacarnet, who owned movie theaters in
Avignon and Valence, had experienced difficulty in getting ac-
cess to first release films distributed by UGC. In this case, the
mediating session records established that UGC's refusal to do
business with Mr. Malacarnet was due to the fact that Mr. Mala-
carnet had embarked on a policy of discounting tickets and had
widely-advertised his pricing policy in the press. Eventually the
mediator negotiated an agreement securing access for Mr. Mala-
carnet to films distributed by UGC on the condition that he
bring his ticket prices back in line with the prices charged by
UGC-controlled movie theaters. The Conseil found that the ma-
jor distributors' condition requiring that films they released in
movie theaters under their control in Paris not be shown in in-
dependent movie theaters competing with their network in
other cities constituted a violation of competition law. Similarly,
the Conseil found that the agreement under which an independ-
ent theater would be offered first run films by one of the cinema
networks if the independent theater owner increased his ticket
prices also violated competition law violations. As a result, the
Conseil fined the networks.
A related case handled by the Paris Court of Appeals con-
cerned the release of the film Indiana Jones. In this case, the
network that had agreed to release this potentially very success-
ful film controlled the Grand Rex, the largest movie theater in
Paris, located on the Grands Boulevards, a high density area of
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movie theaters similar to that of Broadway in New York City.
The network involved had agreed with the distributor to release
Indiana Jones in this theater, as well as in a number of movie
theaters it controlled elsewhere in the Paris area, in its French-
dubbed version. A well-known independent theater, the Max
Linder, located in the same neighborhood, was denied the possi-
bility of releasing the film in its original language version due to
pressure exerted on the U.S. distributor of Indiana Jones by the
French distributor heading the theater network to which the
Grand Rex belonged. The French distributor, who had agreed
to release the film via its network, argued that the independent
Max Linder theater would compete with the Grand Rex theater
and the U.S. distributor of Indiana Jones did not want to risk an-
tagonizing the network which was going to release the film na-
tionally. In a highly-publicized judgment, which led to a heated
controversy regarding the respective limits of intellectual and ar-
tistic property rights law and competition law, the Paris Court of
Appeals decided that the U.S. distributor of Indiana Jones and
the French distributor who planned on releasing this film had
entered into a conspiracy with the intent to restrict competition
and that this conspiracy constituted a violation of competition
law, despite a last minute plea by Steven Spielberg explaining to
the Court that the commercial success of Indiana Jones would be
compromised if the film was released simultaneously at the
Grand Rex and the Max Linder. The Court therefore ordered
the U.S. distributor of Indiana Jones to allow the release of the
film in its original version in the independent cinema.
Competition problems created by a combination of high
horizontal concentration and vertical integration are not unique
to the movie industry. They also exist in other media markets
such as the still poorly-developed French cable industry, as a
1991 decision of the Conseil suggests.3" The regulatory regime
of the French cable industry was first defined in 1984 and modi-
fied in 1986.19 Any local government ("commune") or set of lo-
cal governments can decide to establish a cable network and
freely choose both the provider of the infrastructure and the op-
38. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1991, Rapport annuel pour l'anne 1991, An-
nexe 58 at 130, D&ision No. 91-D-51 en date du 19 novembre 1991 relative au march6
des programmes de tlfIvision r~servds d la diffusion sur les rdseaux cables.
39. Loi No. 86-1607 du 30 septembre 1986 relative A la libert6 de communication,
modifi~e, notamment par la loi No. 90-1170 du 29 d~cembre 1990.
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erator of the cable network. Cable television network operators
must obtain a license from the Conseil Sup6rieur de
l'Audiovisuel ("CSA"), the regulatory body for the audiovisual
sector, defining the type of service they are going to offer, the
number and nature of the channels they will operate as jointly
determined by the operator and the local government, and their
responsibilities. The operator is then free to fulfill its service ob-
ligations in any appropriate way it sees fit.
A small number of large firms, often originally water distri-
bution system operators, have diversified their activities to cover
most of the public service needs of local governments because
there is a long tradition in France of local government delegat-
ing public service management, such as water distribution, fu-
neral services, garbage collection, and public lighting, to private
operators. At the beginning of the 1980s they added the cable
television network management to their already long .list of activ-
ities. Thus, the largest cable television network operator in
France is the Compagnie G6n6rale de Videocommunication
("CGV"), a subsidiary of the Compagnie G6n6rale des Eaux. At
the beginning of the 1990s, subscribers to cable television net-
works operated by the Compagnie G6n6rale des Eaux repre-
sented roughly forty percent of all French cable television sub-
scribers. Concurrently, the second largest operator of cable tele-
vision networks was Lyonnaise Communications ("LC"), a
member of Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez, the group that operates
the Paris cable television network, among others. A third major
cable television operator is Communication Dveloppement
("CD"), a subsidiary of a state-owned financial institution, the
Caisse des D6pots et Consignations.
To fulfill their obligations, cable television network opera-
tors needed programs and various independent producers set
out to design thematic programs to be sold to cable television
operators. Contracts signed between the cable television opera-
tor of a particular area and the producer of a thematic program
often included a clause giving exclusivity on the theme for the
relevant site to the producer of the thematic program. TV
Mondes, an independent thematic program producer, was estab-
lished at the end of 1985. Its programming was devoted to
presenting foreign cultures, a theme no one else had covered
previously. It approached the three major cable television oper-
ators and in 1988 it entered a preliminary agreement with the
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CGV group by which, in order to test audience reaction, the
cable operator would broadcast its program for three months,
experimentally and free of charge, on three sites, Montpellier,
Massy Palaiseau, and Villeurbanne. Subsequently, in 1988 and
1989, the three cable television operators integrated vertically
and began producing thematic programs. The CGV group es-
tablished a subsidiary, Compagnie G~n~rale d'Images ("CGI")
that started working on a program called Plan~te having a theme
similar to one proposed by TV Mondes. Plan~te was ready for
broadcast by the end of 1988.
At the end of the TV Mondes audience reaction test, negoti-
ations with the CGV group were prolonged and it was only at the
end of 1990 that the CGV group offered to broadcast the TV
Mondes program on some of its sites at a price of 1.5 Francs per
subscriber per month. Concurrently, on some of its other sites,
CGV had contracted for the Plan~te program, produced by its
subsidiary CGI, as well as for two other programs, TV Sport and
Canal 3, coproduced by CGI and the two other major cable tele-
vision operators, at a price of six Francs per subscriber per
month. TV Mondes refused the CGV proposal, arguing that it
could not cover its costs at that price because relatively few
French households subscribed to cable television at that time.
During that same period, TV Mondes had also entered into ne-
gotiations with LC, the second major cable television operator.
In March 1989, LC offered to broadcast the TV Mondes program
free of charge on several of its sites, including central Paris and
several suburban sites. Unable to face the cost necessary to pro-
duce three months of programs without compensation, TV
Mondes declined this proposal. Finally, in April 1989, the third
cable operator, CD, offered TV Mondes a three-year contract at
a price of six Francs per subscriber per month, but the contract
was for only one site, a small town called Saint Avold. Given the
very small number of potential subscribers and the fact that this
contract was the only one it had been able to negotiate, TV
Mondes had to decline the offer. TV Mondes went bankrupt
shortly after the end of 1989.
While these difficult negotiations were taking place with TV
Mondes, starting in February 1989 CGV decided to broadcast its
subsidiary's program, Plan~te, at a price of six Francs per sub-
scriber per month on all of its sites, representing forty percent of
all cable television subscribers. It entered an agreement in July
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1989 with CD, the third largest cable television operator, under
which CD would show the Plan&e program on all of its present
and future sites. Finally, in the second half of 1990, it entered
into a co-production agreement for the Plan~te program with,
among others, LC, the second largest cable television operator.
As a result of these developments, Plante is now shown on most
sites in France, regardless of the cable television operator in-
volved.
It should be added that the contracts signed between
Plan~te's producer and the cable television operators not only
had the aforementioned exclusivity clause, but also allowed
Plan~te's producer to refuse to permit similar programs to be
shown on the sites on which its own program had been shown
for a period of six months after the termination of its contract
with the cable operators. The circumstances already described
in the TV Mondes case could be. viewed as either consistent with
a situation in which the TV Mondes program turned out to be
distinctly inferior to the Plan~te program and lost in a fair com-
petition or consistent with a situation in which an independent
producer was prevented from entering a market through dis-
criminatory tactics used by vertically-integrated cable operators
who were both potential distributors of this program and com-
petitors of TV Mondes.
The Conseil decided that the cable operators, and in partic-
ular CGV, did not offer evidence that the commercial tests of the
TV Mondes program showed that the this program's public ap-
peal was significantly inferior to the commercial appeal of other
programs, such as TV Sport, that were broadcasted by CGV on its
sites. It decided that CGV had violated Article 8-2 of the Ordi-
nance by abusing the commercial dependency in which it held
TV Mondes through discriminatory pricing policies. The Con-
seil sanctioned CGV by imposing a fine of one million Francs.
Furthermore, the Conseil decided that exclusivity clauses in con-
tracts between program producers and cable operators could
have the effect of restraining competition and were not justified
by any legitimate consideration. Subsequently, the Paris Court
of Appeals viewed the facts of the TV Mondes case differently. It
noted that, although substitutable to the Plan&e program, the
TV Mondes program was not strictly identical. In particular, the
TV Mondes program was to be presented in the original lan-
guage version with subtitles whereas the Plan~te program was to
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be dubbed in French. Given these differences, it was not clear
that CGV had misused its bargaining power with TV Mondes
when it offered to broadcast its program for 1.5 Francs per
month per subscriber. As a result, the Paris Court of Appeals
overturned the sanctions imposed by the Conseil on CGV for
discriminatory anticompetitive abuse of commercial depen-
dency. It did, however, sustain the condemnation of the exclu-
sivity clauses.
Considering these cases, one could legitimately ask whether
the Conseil is too receptive to complaints alleging that dominant
firms try to keep competitors out of their markets. The two cases
reviewed above are similar in the sense that they both concern
the audiovisual industry and that in both the operators of the
infrastructures supplying access to final consumers, movie thea-
ters in one case and cable networks in the other, have integrated
vertically into the production and the distribution of programs.
There are dissimilarities between the two cases, however. In the
movie theater case, it was clear that the dominant firms had de-
liberatedly tried to use their economic power to eliminate com-
petition by either conditioning the release in their theaters of
films from other distributors on the fact that the other distribu-
tors would not simultaneously release these films in theaters
competing with their own or by conditioning the release in in-
dependent theaters of films for which they owned the rights on
the fact that these independent theaters would follow pricing
policies similar to their own. In the cable television case the
competition issue was not as clear. The Conseil did not establish
that CGV had a dominant position. It merely decided that it had
abused its bargaining power vis-A-vis TV Mondes. The source of
TV Mondes' problem was that CGV had integrated into program
production through its subsidiary CGI and was involved in pro-
ducing a program similar to the TV Mondes program.
In these circumstances it is obvious that CGV had a short
term interest in showing the CGI program on its cable television
network as long as the price it would have had to pay for the TV
Mondes program was superior to the variable costs of producing
the CGI program. Thus only a price for the TV Mondes pro-
gram inferior to the variable cost of production of the CGI pro-
gram would have justified CGV choosing the TV Mondes pro-
gram, assuming the programs were of equal quality. This may
well explain why CGV indicated to TV Mondes that it would be
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willing to show the TV Mondes program on its network at a price
of 1.5 Francs per month per subscriber, a price considerably
lower than the six Francs per month per subscriber that it paid
for the CGI program. In fact, if CGV had wanted to eliminate its
competitor altogether it would probably have refused to make
any offer to TV Mondes. Thus, in the cable television case one
may say that CGV was simply acting in its own interest. Because
CGV did not have a dominant position, TV Mondes had the op-
tion of selling its programs to other cable television operators
and, strictly speaking, did not need to have its programs shown
on the CGV cable network.
Under these circumstances, one may wonder why CGV
should have been held to the same standards as those usually
applied to firms having a dominant position or operating an es-
sential facility. Furthermore, economic theory suggests that
even if CGV had a dominant position or a monopoly, neither a
price discrimination in favor of its own programs nor a straight
refusal to deal with an independent producer would have led to
a loss in consumer welfare as long as there was a positive supply
in the production of programs, a condition which the Conseil
did not examine. This is because CGV could have an interest in
refusing to deal with an independent producer in the long term
only if it were able to produce a similar type of program of at
least equal consumer appeal, in which case no loss in consumer
welfare would result from a refusal to deal with an independent
producer. Considering all aspects of this case, the Conseil's
analysis seems incomplete, assuming one adheres to the idea
that the goal of competition law is to promote efficiency and
that, as a result, only anticompetitive practices which are likely to
lead to welfare losses should be prohibited.
V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND
ADVERTISING SECTORS
When analyzing media sector competition issues in France,
one should also keep in mind the close relationship in this coun-
try between the media sector and the advertising sector. A
number of media sell their advertising space through specialized
firms that are often subsidiaries of the media or of advertising
agencies. Advertising agencies are often also shareholders of
media. A 1987 opinion of the Conseil on the advertising sector
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provides a good example of this phenomenon and of the subse-
quent competition problems it creates.4" In this opinion the
Conseil explained that the Havas Group was, at the time, the
largest group of advertising agencies in France, the largest seller
of billboard advertising space, the largest seller of advertising
time for radio commercials, the largest seller of advertising spots
in movie theaters, the exclusive publisher and seller of advertis-
ing space in the official telephone directory yellow pages, the
largest French publisher, through its control of CEP-Communi-
cation, of books, professional journals, and news magazines, the
main shareholder of Canal +, the only French commercial pay-
television station, an important shareholder of Audiofina, the
majority owner of the Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de T6lvi-
sion which controls Radio Television Luxembourgeoise, the fifty
percent owner of M6, another important French commercial tel-
evision station, and the fifty percent owner of two national radio
stations, Fun Radio and M 40. Additionally, Havas also con-
trolled part of the sale of advertising space of FR3, one of the
two public television stations partially financed by advertising.
This example is not unique. Publicis, a very large advertis-
ing agency, is also integrated and occupies important positions
in the sale of billboard advertising space, the sale of movie thea-
ter advertising space, and the sale of radio and television adver-
tising time. One should also note that starting in the 1970s,
France saw the rapid development of block-buying agencies for
advertising space. The original idea behind the concept of an
advertising space block-buying agency originated with Gilbert
Gross, the founder of Soci~t6 Gilbert Gross Michel Doliner in
1969, which changed its name to Carat in 1993. Gross' idea was
based on the notion that such a firm could profit by buying
blocks of advertising space in all kinds of media and then resel-
ling the space to advertisers or to advertising agencies, despite
the entrepreneurial risk involved in possibly being unable to re-
sell the space.
The media were willing to grant Carat large discounts be-
cause Carat reduced the media's own risk by buying large blocks
of space or time for commercial advertising early and by paying
40. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour l'anne 1993, An-
nexe 66 at 394, Decision en date du 15 dfcembre 1993 relative A des pratiques relev~es
dans le secteur de la publicit6.
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promptly for the advertising space or time, regardless of whether
or not it had found someone to whom it could resell the adver-
tising space or time. During the 1980s, when the liberalization
of television and radio was rapidly increasing competition for ad-
vertising revenues, the media were glad to trade off some their
revenues in exchange for some security. This formula was also
particularly appealing to newcomers, particularly newly-created
radio stations, who were often in need of cash. In addition, ad-
vertising agencies found it interesting to buy from Carat because
they obtained better prices than they would have obtained by
buying directly from the media.
As time passed, advertising agencies found it more interest-
ing to join forces and create their own advertising space block-
buying agencies. In 1986, for example, Lintas created Pub-
limedia Service ("PMS") in a joint venture with McCann Erick-
son. Similarly, five U.S. advertising agencies, J. Walter Thomson,
Ogilvy & Mather, Grey, DDB-Needham, and CLM-BBDO, and
two French advertising agencies, RSCG and BDDP, created a
joint venture called TMPF for the same purpose. Finally, three
advertising time and space block-buying agencies were created
within the group Havas-Eurocom. At the end of the 1980s,
Carat, PMS, TMPF, and Havas-Eurocom bought 19%, 16%, 16%,
and 13%, respectively, of all the available French media advertis-
ing space. Needless to say, this combination of vertical upward
integration of advertising agencies into the media, both through
outright ownership and through partial control of advertising
space-selling agencies, a horizontal concentration of advertising
groups, and a concentration of advertising space and time block-
buying agencies has not facilitated smooth and transparent com-
petition either among the media or among advertising agencies
themselves.
For the Conseil, which examined competition problems
raised by the relationship between the media group and the ad-
vertising groups in 198741 and again in 1993,42 one of the troub-
ling aspects of the situation lay in the complete lack of trans-
parency of the cost of advertising space in competing media.
41. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1987, Rapport annuel pour l'ann&e 87, Annexe
85 at 111, Avis relatif au secteur de la publicit .
42. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour 'ann&e 1993, An-
nexe 66 at 394, Dkision en date du 15 d&embre 1993 relative A des pratiques relev~es
dans le secteur de la publicit.
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The official tariffs for advertising space published by the media
were largely meaningless because the media made a regular
practice of giving huge confidential rebates to block-buying
agencies. This confidentiality suited the media because they
were able to make advertisers who bought space directly from
them pay their inflated published tariffs without losing the clien-
tele of the block-buying agencies. Furthermore, the media
hoped that the large confidential discounts given to block-buy-
ing agencies linked to advertising groups and to media planners
would give the latter an incentive to place a lot of orders with
them. To ensure the confidentiality of the rebates that they
granted to advertising time and space block-buying agencies, the
media entered into bilateral agreements with these agencies.
These agreements stipulated that the only price that would ap-
pear on invoices would be the gross list price of the space or
time bought and that the rebate would appear on separate docu-
ments that were not made available to advertisers. In addition,
competing media, such as Le Monde and Liberation, two major
daily newspapers, would occasionally collude on their published
tariffs or the rate of rebates to be given to block-buying agencies.
The advertising space block-buying agencies did not want adver-
tisers to know at which price they had bought the space because
either they wanted to keep a proportion of the rebates for them-
selves or because they wanted to ensure the possibility of di-
recting advertisers toward those media that they owned directly
or indirectly. Finally, advertising agencies that either owned
their own advertising space block-buying agencies or bought ad-
vertising space from independent advertising space or time
block-buying agencies felt that the usual margin they were able
to charge for their services was insufficient. Therefore, they
were eager to secure a complimentary profit source by keeping
part of the difference between the price actually paid for the
advertising space or time that they bought on behalf of their ad-
vertising clients and the price they actually charged these clients
for the space. All this took place despite the fact that contracts
between the advertisers and their advertising agencies generally
contained a clause granting the advertising agencies a mandate
to buy advertising time or space on behalf of advertisers and pro-
viding that advertising agencies would pass any rebate they
might get from the media on to their client advertisers.
In its 1993 decision, the Conseil decided that, through a
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complex web of parallel bilateral vertical agreements, a number
of media had conspired with advertising groups to make transac-
tions for the purchase of advertising space or time non-transpar-
ent in order to restrain price competition among both advertis-
ing agencies and competing media by allowing the media to
charge inflated tariffs to advertisers buying directly from them.
The Conseil also found that Eurocom and Carat had entered a
non-agression pact to the effect that each would refuse to accept
as its advertising clientele former clients of the other group and
had exchanged information about the rebates they received
from specific media. It determined that these practices were vio-
lations of Article 7 of the Ordinance and fined twelve media en-
tities and twelve advertising agencies a total of sixty million
Francs (US$10 million). The Conseil's decision was partially
nullified by the Paris Court of Appeals on procedural grounds.
The same practices were subsequently reexamined by the Con-
seil which again found them in violation of the Ordinance. This
second decision was not appealed. As the first case was progress-
ing in front of the Conseil, Parliament passed a law regulating
and making more transparent the relationship between the me-
dia, advertisers, and advertising agencies.43 As a result, the me-
dia must now charge advertisers directly for the advertising space
or time they buy.
VI. ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES, COMPETITION AND
THE MEDIA
In the previously discussed decision concerning the
purchase of broadcast rights of major international sports events
by television stations through the EBU,44 the Conseil did not ad-
dress one of the issues raised by La Cinq. La Cinq had argued
that the fact that the French members of the OFRT, before bid-
ding for the exclusive collective rights to broadcast an interna-
tional sports event in France, had entered a market-sharing
agreement regarding which one of them would broadcast each
section of the event constituted an illicit market-sharing agree-
ment. One can only speculate as to what position the Conseil
43. Loi No. 93-122 du 29janvier 1993 relative A la prevention de la corruption et A
la transparence de la vie 6conomique et des procedures publiques, modifi~e.
44. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1991, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1991, An-
nexe 18 at 42, Dcision No. 91-D-11 en date du 19 mars 1991 concernant les Organ-
ismes fran~ais de radiodiffusion et t~l~vision (O.F.R.T.).
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might have taken on this issue. In the author's opinion such an
agreement should not be considered to be a violation of the
competition law for at least two reasons. In the EBU system,
each member of a national pool having participated in a bid is
granted the exclusive broadcast rights to the event if the EBU
bid is successful. Therefore, these exclusive broadcast rights are
a resource collectively owned by potential competitors. In most
circumstances, competition leads to a better allocation of re-
sources among the activities of independent firms that bid
against each other for the use of the resources. This competi-
tion model assumes that resources controlled by one ,firm .can-
not be employed by another competing firm. The case at hand
does not fulfill this hypothesis because the resource in question,
the broadcast rights to an international sports event, is collec-
tively owned by the competitors. In this context, which could be
described as an ownership externality, preventing the sharing of
collective rights among owners would lead to an obviously ineffi-
cient allocation of programs among competing television sta-
tions. It is clear that without a market-sharing agreement, the
competing television broadcasters collectively owning the exclu-
sive right to an important international sports event might de-
cide to broadcast simultaneously the same part of that event if
they acted independently of one other. For example, if two com-
peting television broadcasters collectively own the rights to the
Summer Olympic Games and if seventy percent of television
viewers prefer to watch a track event while the other thirty per-
cent prefer to watch a swimming competition, then assuming
that the two competitions occur simultaneously, both broadcast-
ers would show the track event because each would have a poten-
tial seventy percent share of the television audience if the other
decided to broadcast the swimming event. On the other hand,
both broadcasters would have a potential thirty-five percent
share of the television audience if the other decided to also show
the same track event and the audience for the track event was
split between the two broadcasters. Neither one would have
much incentive to show the swimming competition because its
maximum potential audience would be only thirty percent or
much less than the normally expected audience for a track event
broadcast. Such an outcome would be inefficient because televi-
sion broadcasting is a public good, in the economic sense of this
term. The duplication of resources implied by the double
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broadcasting of the same competition would reduce unnecessa-
rily the choice offered to television viewers and therefore would
diminish their overall satisfaction. In fact, all the track enthusi-
asts could have watched this competition on one broadcaster's
channel while all the swimming enthusiasts could have watched
the swimming competition on the other broadcaster's channel.
There would be no need for simultaneous broadcasting of the
same competition on two different channels. Indeed, it would
unnecessarily increase the broadcast costs for the competition
and prevent some viewers from being able to watch another
competition that they-might prefer. Permitting a priori market
sharing between the two broadcasters would improve things by
allowing them to negotiate their respective financial contribu-
tions to the acquisition of the broadcast rights, eliminating un-
certainty as to what the competitors want to broadcast, and al-
lowing for better coverage of major sports events in most cases.
The double externality in this case, due to the fact of collec-
tive ownership of a resource by competitors and the fact that
television broadcasting is to a large extent a public good, means
that competition among broadcasters serving the same audience
does not lead to efficient solutions. If the goal of competition
law is to promote efficiency and if there is a divorce between the
two in certain circumstances, the efficient solution should be
preferred. In this case, the market-sharing agreement between
competing television broadcasters negotiating the purchase of
collective exclusive broadcast rights should have been exempted
from the general prohibition against anticompetitive agree-
ments by the use of Article 10 of the Ordinance exempting an-
ticompetitive agreements that contribute to economic progress
when such economic progress could not have been obtained
without the anticompetitive agreement and when the benefits
are passed on to consumers.
In another case discussed earlier concerning the AFP news
agency,45 the Conseil also considered that a public good was in-
volved. In that case, a would-be newspaper publisher, Ver-
imedia, had subscribed to AFP's general news service for newspa-
pers, but had never launched its newspaper project. Instead, it
had created a telematic newsletter on the Minitel, a low-speed
45. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1989, Rapport annuel pour I'ann~e 1989, An-
nexe 45 at 133, Decision No. 89-D-38 relative A une saisine de la Socit6 Plurim~dia.
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videotext system with proprietary software specific to France. In
the case, it was also established that Verimedia's telematic news
bulletin had used some of the uncut, unedited news releases it
had obtained through its subscription to the general news ser-
vice of AFP. AFP contended that Verimedia had breached its
contract by using the news items it had obtained from its AFP
subscription on the Minitel. It was standard procedure for AFP
to include a clause that specified the conditions under which the
subscriber could use the service and the information contained
in its news releases in the contracts AFP signed with subscribers
to its general news service. Subscription contracts to the general
news service also prohibited the use of the service or the infor-
mation it provided for any purpose other than the one specified
in contract.
The price paid for a news service subscription may vary from
one subscriber to the next depending on what each subscriber is
going to use the subscription for. In Verimedia's case, the sub-
scription contract specified that the general news service and the
information it provided were going to be used exclusively for the
publishing of a printed monthly magazine and that Verimedia
was prohibited from using this information for any other pur-
pose, from communicating this information to a third party, and
from duplicating or distributing it. When AFP discovered that
the magazine had never been launched and that instead Ver-
imedia was publishing a telematic news bulletin and was using
the news releases it obtained from its subscription to the AFP
general news service, AFP terminated its contract with Verimedia
and subsequently refused to do business with it. Verimedia then
complained to the Conseil that, on the one hand, AFP's refusal
to do business with Verimedia constituted an abuse of its domi-
nant position prohibited by Article 8 of the Ordinance and that,
on the other hand, the clauses in AFP's general news service sub-
scription contracts limiting the use one could make of the infor-
mation provided were also abusive, anticompetitive, and
designed to protect AFP's dominant position.
Limitations imposed by a dominant firm on the use of an
industrial product that it sells or a professional service that it
provides to a client firm, particularly a limitation on the client
firm's ability to resell the product or the service, can arouse sus-
picion, especially when no question of patent or trademark in-
fringement exists. Such limitations can, in some circumstances,
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be viewed as both an infringement on the client's commercial
freedom and a practice by the dominant supplier aimed at limit-
ing competition. In the case of the AFP news service, however,
the Conseil based its finding of non-violation with respect to the
limitations imposed by the dominant supplier on the nature of
news as a public good. A public good can be defined, from an
economic analysis point of view, as a product or service that does
not get destroyed while it is being consumed or, to put it differ-
ently, a product or service unit that can be simultaneously con-
sumed by many users. For example, while several consumers
cannot simultaneously wear the same pair of shoes, several televi-
sion viewers can simultaneously watch the same television pro-
gram. Due to the nature of news as a public good, a subscriber
to AFP's general news service could, for example, use the news
for its own publication and simultaneously resell it for a modest
fee to potential clients by putting it on a videotext system such as
the Minitel or on the Internet. The cost of doing so would be
the cost of one subscription to AFP's general news service plus
the very limited cost required to put the news on the Minitel or
the Internet. None of AFP's potential clients would find it in
their interest to subscribe directly to the AFP general news ser-
vice and bear the full cost of a subscription to this service alone
because this cost could be divided among all the potential clients
of AFP. Allowing subscribers to the AFP news service or to any
other news service to resell that news would eventually result in
the news agency having only one subscriber, causing the news
agency to go out of business. Competition at the retail level
would lead to a market failure and the disappearance of the ser-
vice itself, which would be inefficient. That is the main reason
that news agencies may want to control the use of the news they
provide and prevent their subscribers from reselling that news
among themselves. On the basis of this analysis and in recogni-
tion of the potential conflict between competition and efficiency
in the case of public goods, the Conseil decided that the con-
tested clauses of the AFP contracts did not violate the Ordinance
and that AFP's refusal to deal with Verimedia did not constitute
an abuse of its dominant position.
VII. MERGER CONTROL
A distinction should be made regarding merger control be-
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tween the printed press and the audiovisual sector, including ra-
dio, television, and cable television. In both sectors, specific leg-
islation aimed at guaranteeing the pluralism of information sets
limits on ownership concentration and media control. The
existence of these specific regulations does not necessarily mean
that the merger provisions of the competition law do not apply
to mergers in these sectors, however. While there is no specific
limitation on ownership concentration for news magazine own-
ership, Article 11 of the November 27, 1986 law on the legal re-
gime of the press does set a limit on the ownership concentra-
tion or control of certain daily newspapers. Under Article 11 no
individual or firm can own, directly or indirectly, daily general or
political newspapers having a combined readership of more
than thirty percent of the total national daily readership of news-
papers. Violations of this Article are criminal offenses that can
result in fines or imprisonment. Therefore, from a legal stand-
point, newspaper mergers are subject to two sets of constraints:
those arising from the merger provisions of the competition law,
as enforced by the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Conseil,
and those arising from the 1986 law on the press, as enforced by
the criminal courts. The enforcement of Article 11 of the No-
vember 1986 law has been lax, however.
The basis of audiovisual sector regulation is the law of Sep-
tember 30, 1986, as amended by a January 1989 law and by a
February 1994 law.46 An important aspect of the 1986 law con-
cerns limitations set on the level of ownership concentration in
the audiovisual sector. Three kinds of rules apply in this area.
First, an individual or entity cannot own more than 49% of a
national terrestrial television station, more than 50% of a re-
gional terrestrial television station, or more than 50% of a satel-
lite television station. Second, rules exist to limit multiple own-
ership of the same type of media entity. An individual or entity
owning between 15-25% of a terrestrial television station cannot
own more than 15% of another terrestrial television station.
Similarly, if a person owns more than 5% of the shares or the
voting rights of two terrestrial television stations, that person's
ownership of a third terrestrial television station cannot be more
than 5%. Regarding radio or satellite television stations, if a per-
46. Loi No. 86-1607 du 30 septembre 1986 relative a la libert6 de communication,
modifi~e.
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son owns more than a third of the capital or of the voting rights
of such an undertaking, that person cannot own more than a
third of the capital or the voting rights of another radio or satel-
lite television station. If a person owns more than 5% of two
radio or satellite television stations, that person cannot own
more than 5% of a third radio or satellite television station. A
person can own an unlimited number of participations in radio
or television stations if each participation is equal or less than
5% of the capital of each station and if the satellite television
stations are regional, broadcasting to less than a total of six mil-
lion people. Third, there are rules limiting multimedia concen-
tration. At the national level, a person or an entity must respect
at least two of the following thresholds: having less than 20% of
daily newspaper circulation, a potential terrestrial television au-
dience of fewer than four million people, a potential radio sta-
tion audience of fewer than thirty million people, or a potential
cable television audience of fewer than six million people. At
the regional level, a person or an entity must meet two of the
following conditions: owning one national or regional terres-
trial television station, one radio station having an audience of
more than 10% of the potential audience of the broadcast area,
one cable television network, or one or more daily newspapers.47
Finally, it should be mentioned that Article 41-4 of the 1986
law established shared responsibilities in the area of competition
between the audiovisual regulator, the CSA, and the Conseil. Ar-
ticle 41-4 allows the Conseil to apply Title III of the Ordinance,
prohibiting anticompetitive agreements, abuses of dominant po-
sition, and abuses of dependency to the audiovisual sector, but
not Title V regarding merger control. Therefore, in principle,
the merger control provisions included in the Ordinance do not
apply to the audiovisual sector. The CSA is responsible for con-
trolling mergers in this sector based upon the 1986 audiovisual
sector law. Media mergers in the audiovisual sector often imply
a concentration in the sale of advertising space or time available
for these media and therefore affect the relevant advertising
markets. The Conseil has jurisdiction to control media mergers
in the audiovisual sector to the extent that they affect the adver-
47. The 1986 law has been criticized in various quarters following an increase in
concentration, particularly of radio stations. The chairman of the C.S.A., the commis-
sion in charge of regulating the audiovisual sector, has called for stricter measures to
control concentration in the audiovisual sector.
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rising sector because the CSA cannot control mergers in the ad-
vertising sector and the merger control provided by the Ordi-
nance applies to all activities of production, distribution, or serv-
ices not explicitly excluded from the scope of the Ordinance,
including advertising.
The Conseil analyzed the takeover by the Compagnie Lux-
embourgeoise de Telecommunication ("CLT"), a radio and tele-
vision operator controlling nine television stations and thirteen
radio stations in Europe, of two radio stations, Fun Radio and M
40.48 The Conseil pointed out that the sale of advertising time
slots on French radio and television stations controlled by the
CLT group took place through joint ventures between the CLT
group and the Havas group. The sale of radio advertising space
on RT, Fun Radio, and M 40 was carried out through one of
these joint ventures, IP-RTV. In line with its traditional analysis
of advertising space markets, the Conseil decided that there was
a specific market for radio advertising time and that the com-
bined market share of CLT and Fun Radio in this market was
34.3% while the combined market share of the CLT group and
M 40 was 32.8%, both thus being larger than the threshold share
of 25% percent below which merger control is not applicable.
The Conseil took into account the fact that in 1993, just
before the proposed merger, IP-RTV changed its rates for the
sale of advertising space on RTL, Fun Radio, and M40 by creat-
ing a special additional discount of 26% for the joint purchase of
advertising time on the three radio stations, plus a fourth re-
gional radio station, Sud Radio, based in the southwest of
France. The Conseil observed that the effect of this additional
discount for the joint purchase of advertising time was quite im-
portant because, for example, an advertiser buying 1.52 million
Francs worth of advertising time on RTL could, for only 50,000
Francs more, secure additional advertising time worth 526,000
Francs on the other three radio stations if the advertiser decided
to buy the advertising space on these other stations jointly with
its purchase of advertising time on RTL.
The Conseil decided that such a practice was all the more
48. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1994, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1994, An-
nexe 101 at 707, Avis No 94-A-26 en date du 15 novembre 1994 relatif a la prise de
contr6le par la Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de T6l&ommunication des stations Fun
Radio et M 40.
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likely to have a significant detrimental effect to the competitors
of radio stations concerned in the merger because RTL had the
highest audience rating of all French radio stations and because
buying advertising time on RTL was a quasi-necessity for any ad-
vertiser wishing to reach certain major segments of the popula-
tion, such as housewives under fifty years of age. Indeed, the
record showed that during the first six months of 1994, following
the adoption of this rebate for joint purchases of advertising
time, the purchase of advertising time on Fun Radio and Sud
Radio increased by 113% and 375%, respectively, whereas it had
increased by only 30% on RFM and 22% on Europe 2, the two
main FM competitors of the radio stations that were parties to
the concentration. The Conseil decided that this rebate scheme
for joint purchases of advertising space on RTL, Fun Radio, M
40, and Sud Radio was an anticompetitive agreement, artificially
designed to discourage advertisers needing space on RTL and
other radio stations from patronizing competitors of Fun Radio,
M 40, and Sud Radio. It reasoned that RTL's takeover of Fun
Radio and M 40 would not only facilitate the continuation of this
practice, but would also make it more difficult to prohibit be-
cause the agreement which, up to that point, was an agreement
among independent potential competitors, and as such was cov-
ered by Article 7 of the Ordinance, would become an agreement
among firms belonging to the same group. Articles 7 and 8 of
the Ordinance would not cover the latter agreement because it
was not obvious that this group could be considered to have a
dominant position in the market for radio advertising time. As a
result of these considerations, the Conseil recommended that
the merger be allowed only under the condition that the parties
involved abolish all rebates for the joint purchase of advertising
time on RTL, Fun Radio, and M 40.
Subsequently, the Minister of Economic Affairs and the
Minister of Trade, who made the final determination on this
merger and were not bound by the opinion of the Conseil, did
not follow the opinion of the Conseil and allowed the merger.
First, they argued that the Conseil had not found that the merg-
ing parties would hold a dominant position and second, that im-
posing a behavioral measure such as that suggested by the Con-
seil as a condition for allowing a merger would defeat the spirit
of merger control which is to avoid meddling in the behavior of
firms. In view of French case law on merger control, the second
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rationale seems to have been little more than an ad hoc argu-
ment, although it was in line with European Community doc-
trine on merger control. The Minister warned the merging
firms, however, that if they grew to have a dominant position,
their discount scheme for the joint purchase of advertising space
would probably be challenged as an anticompetitive abuse pro-
hibited by Article 8 of the Ordinance.
The Conseil had previously voiced a similar concern with
respect to discounts for the joint purchase of advertising space in
1993 when it examined the merger between two major news
magazines, a case previously referred to in the section on rele-
vant market definition.49 It will be recalled that the Conseil had
determined that seven news magazines were in the same market
for advertising space and that the merger in question concerned
the publishers of two of these news magazines because La Gener-
ale Occidentale, owner of various magazines including a news
magazine called L'Express, intended to take a forty percent par-
ticipation in the capital of S.E.B.D.O., publisher of Le Point, an-
other news magazine belonging to the same market as
L'Express. The goal of the merger was to reorganize the adver-
tising space sales activities of the two news magazines. The com-
bined market share of the parties to this merger was 29% of the
relevant market for readership and 30.5% of the relevant market
for advertising space in news magazines, thus exceeding the 25%
threshold for merger control. The Conseil did not see any par-
ticular competition problem in the readership market. It voiced
concern, however, regarding the advertising space market in
news magazines. Indeed, as in the previously mentioned case, a
discount was offered to advertisers jointly purchasing advertising
space simultaneously in L'Express and in Le Point. The Conseil
noted that advertisers who choose to advertise in news magazines
usually do so in two news magazines and that the joint rebate was
likely to artificially discourage advertisers in L'Express from
choosing a competitor of Le Point as a second news magazine in
which to advertise. Nevertheless, the Conseil proposed that the
merger be approved in view of the efficiency gains due to re-
duced paper and printing costs that were likely to result from
49. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour l'ann~e 1993 at 520,
Avis No. 93-A-13 relatif i la prise de participation de la Socit6 G~nrale Occidentale
dans le capital de la socit6 d'exploitation de l'hebdomadaire Le Point.
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this merger and which were estimated to represent about 2.6%
of the total operating costs of the two news magazines.
In 1993, the Conseil was also called upon to review two
mergers in the movie industry.5" In both cases, one of the verti-
cally integrated film groups was acquiring new movie theaters in
central Paris. The first merger concerned an exchange of own-
ership of movie theaters between Gaumont and Path, the sec-
ond and third largest film distribution groups. The effect of this
exchange was to consolidate the position of Gaumont in central
Paris and to reinforce the position of Path6 in major provincial
cities. Gaumont was acquiring thirty-two movie theaters in Paris,
including twenty-four from Path6, thus raising the total number
of movie theaters it owned in the city to seventy-six and its mar-
ket share from 20% to 31.5% of total Paris box office revenues.
Conversely, besides the twenty-four movie theaters it was selling
to Gaumont, Path6 also stopped programming thirty-one other
theaters in Paris so that the number of movie theaters it con-
trolled in central Paris dropped from ninety to thirty-five and its
share of box office revenues decreased from 24.57% to 8%. In
exchange for the twenty-four movie theaters acquired from
Path6 in Paris, Gaumont was selling to Path6 twenty-nine movie
theaters in five major provincial cities, Caen, Grenoble, Toulon,
Aix en Provence, and Nice. UGC, the largest of the three major
film distribution groups at the exhibition level, who was not a
party to this first merger, owned ninety-one movie theaters in
Paris and programmed eleven others. Its share of Paris box of-
fice revenues was 36%. MK2, also not a party to the merger,
owned eighteen movie theaters and had a market share of 5.7%.
Finally, there were seventy-five other movie theaters in Paris of a
lesser reputation that often specialized in the exhibition of X-
rated movies, representing a total market share of nineteen per-
cent.
To arrive at its opinion regarding the potential effect of this
concentration on competition, the Conseil conducted a detailed
50. Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour 'ann~e 1993, An-
nexe 75 at 488, Avis No. 93-A-01 en date du 12 janvier 1993 relatif A la cession
r~ciproque de salles de cinema entre les Socikts Gaumont et Path6 Cinema ou
certaines de leurs filiales; Conseil de la concurrence, D. 1993, Rapport annuel pour
l'annee 1993, Annexe 79 at 510, Avis No. 93-A-12 en date du 29 juin 1993 relatif A
I'acquisition par la Socik6 U.G.C. des salles de cinema George V, Forum Horizon, et
Forum Orient-Express.
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analysis of the release plans for first run films. Taken into con-
sideration was the fact that, in a period of declining movie thea-
ter attendance, the practice was to release films for an initial
week simultaneously in a large number of prestigious movie the-
aters in Paris and in major provincial cities in order to maximize
the short term return of the advertising campaigns undertaken
at the time of release. Then a film was moved to lesser or
smaller movie theaters as soon as it did not attract large enough
audiences to fill the movie theaters in which it was first released.
Some films considered to have large box office potential were
released simultaneously in up to fifty movie theaters in Paris.
The Conseil's analysis also considered the geographical distribu-
tion of movie theaters in Paris to be relevant. There are four
neigborhoods where movie theaters are highly concentrated: the
Champs Elys~es, the Grands Boulevards, Montparnasse, and the
Quartier Latin. Attendance at movie theaters in the first three
of these four neighborhoods represented half of the total Paris
movie theater box office. Moviegoers would often go to these
areas without knowing in advance what film they wanted to see
and make their choice upon arrival. It was thus particularly im-
portant for the success of a film that it be exhibited in a suffi-
cient number of movie theaters in these neighborhoods. After
the merger, UGC, who was not a party to the merger, and
Gaumont, whose position was reinforced by the merger, would
have owned 90% of the movie theaters in the Champs Elys6es
and Montparnasse areas and 65% of the movie theaters in the
Grands Boulevards area, with Gaumont owning outright 56% of
the movie theaters on the Champs Elys6es.
For the Conseil, this situation created a competition risk
from two standpoints. First, it meant that to successfully release
a film with great potential for popular appeal one had to do so
via either Gaumont or UGC because a Paris release was neces-
sary and Path6 was no longer sufficiently active in the Parisian
market. The merger thus reduced the possibilities for film re-
lease from three to two movie theater networks.
Secondly, the Conseil considered the fact that the two
movie theater groups present in the Parisian market that had a
dominant position in two of the most important movie-going
neighborhoods in Paris were also integrated at the distribution
and production levels. This fact, combined with the fact that
movie theater box office receipts were split among the exhibi-
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tors, the distributors, and the producers, meant that Gaumont
could be tempted to release films it had produced or for which it
had secured the distribution rights in its own movie theaters
rather than films produced or distributed by independent dis-
tributors, even if the latter films might be more attractive to the
public, because Gaumont could compensate for the potentially
lower box office receipts of its own films by obtaining a larger
share of those receipts. It should be noted, however, that for the
reasons already indicated in the previous discussion regarding
vertical integration in the cable television industry, this argu-
ment is questionable in the long term, assuming that a positive
flexibility of film exists. The Conseil also feared that a recent
agreement between Gaumont and Walt Disney by which
Gaumont would release Walt Disney films in France might lead
to a considerable reduction in the opportunities offered to other
distributors to release their films in Gaumont theaters.
The Conseil decided to allow the exchange of movie thea-
ters between Gaumont and Path6, provided that Gaumont divest
itself within a year of movie theaters accounting for 2.5% of the
total film box office in Paris in the Champs Elys6es and
Montparnasse neighborhoods and that these movie theaters not
be sold to UGC. It also recommended that Path6 sell the movie
theaters it had acquired in Caen, a city where its market share of
the total movie theater box office receipts would have risen
within a year after the merger to eighty percent. The Minister of
Economic Affairs and the Minister of Culture followed the Con-
seil's recommendations with only some minor adjustments. The
second movie industry merger investigated that same year by the
Conseil involved the purchase by UGC of twenty-three Paris
movie theaters accounting for six percent of the total movie box
office receipts in Paris, including some located in the Champs
Elys6es area. Using the same kind of analysis as in the previous
case, the Conseil recommended that the purchase be allowed,
provided that UGC divest itself of movie theaters in the Champs
Elys6es area representing two percent of total Paris movie thea-
ter box office receipts and that these movie theaters not be sold
to Gaumont.
A final comment is in order about the acquisition by Canal
±, the only pay-television operator in France, of UGC-DA, a com-
pany owning the audiovisual rights for a large number of French
films, to which I alluded in the earlier discussion of the defini-
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tion of relevant markets. As was mentioned previously, the Min-
ister for Economic Affairs decided not to challenge this merger5"
and therefore did not send it for review to the Conseil prior to
giving his approval. In his decision, the Minister decided that
there was a separate market for television broadcast rights for
French films and that the merging firms had a significant share
of this market because their share of this market was well above
the twenty-five percent threshold required for merger control.
In particular, it should be noted that UGC-DA held the rights to
5,000 French films, whereas the five other rights holders active
in the French market collectively held the rights to about 1,700
French films. The issue raised was whether a merger between a
television operator having a monopoly on pay-television and a
dominant firm in the market for the broadcast rights to French-
made films should be allowed due to the fact that television
channels, such as general purpose channels, pay-television chan-
nels, and pay-per-view television channels, are subject to the con-
straint that 40% of the films they show must be French films and
they cannot broadcast more than a total of 192 films per year.
Somewhat surprisingly, given that it is widely recognized
that the ability to program films, particularly French-made films,
is a necessity for commercial viability of most television stations,
the Minister decided to allow the merger. His reasoning was
based upon the fact that the five other free general purpose tele-
vision channels could fulfill their legal obligation to show
French-made films by securing the rights of films owned by one
of the five other holders of broadcast rights for French-made
films, even though the Minister acknowledged in his decision
that only a relatively small number of the 1,700 films for which
these firms owned the rights had sufficient commercial appeal to
be shown on television. The Minister noted that 60% of the
combined total sales of the broadcast rights made by Canal + and
UGC-DA were to free access terrestrial television stations, the
majority of these sales being to three channels that had a signifi-
cant buying power. The Minister also argued that concentra-
tions in the audiovisual sector would give pay-television channels
significant purchasing power in the future. Finally, the Minister
51. Bulletin Officiel de la concurrence de la consommation et de la REpression
des Fraudes, le 5 dcembre 1996 at 608, Lettre du ministre dlgu6 aux finances et au
commerce ext~rieur en date du 7 octobre 1996 relative A une concentration dans le
sqcteur des droits audiovisuels.
MEDIA UNDER FRENCH COMPETITION LAW
contended that the fact that UGC-DA would henceforth be part
of Canal +, an international television operator, would increase
the competitiveness of this group on the international level and
contribute to economic progress.
The Minister's decision in this instance is highly questiona-
ble. It overlooked the fact that technological developments in
television meant that new operators would appear in the near
future and that they would be subject to the same regulatory
constraints as existing channels in terms of local programming
content. Therefore, the demand for French-made films would
expand dramatically even in the short term and new operators
would be largely dependent upon the willingness of Canal + to
sell them the rights to French-made films. This is all the more
true because Canal +'s license provides that it must reinvest a
large share of its revenues in the production of French-made
films. As a result, besides the rights that it acquired to 5,000 old
French-made films, Canal + also owns the rights to approxi-
mately eighty percent of all recently made French films. By fo-
cusing only on the acquisition of the rights for old French films
and the state of the television scene at the time of the merger,
the Minister voluntarily overlooked some of the most significant
and dynamic aspects of competition in this regulatorily con-
strained environment. The Minister noted that foreign firms,
such as Warner, Turner, MCA Universal, and Columbia Sony,
that are active in the French market for television broadcast
rights also own the rights for large numbers of foreign-made
films having greater commercial appeal than French films. This
comment was irrelevant because the Minister rightly established
that French films are not a substitute for foreign-made films for
television programming due to the regulatory environment of
television in France. The behavior of Canal + in the market for
broadcast rights to French-made films is now being challenged
under the provisions prohibiting anticompetitive abuses of dom-
inant position.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the case law on media competition issues
in France suggests that such issues raise complex questions and
that great caution must be exercised when applying competition
law in this sector. The time aspect of competition analysis is es-
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pecially crucial, particularly in certain subsectors such as the au-
diovisual sector, not only because the assessment of the impact
on competition of a particular practice may be different depend-
ing on whether one considers the short term or the long term,
but also because the definition of relevant markets is often not
the same in the short and the long terms due to rapidly evolving
technology creating new opportunities in the provision of audio-
visual services and the convergence of certain media markets.
Another difficulty lies in the distinction which should be made
between two goals which may not always be consistent: the goal
of protecting competitors and preventing foreclosure of new
market entrants and the goal of protecting competition. As seen
in the earlier discussion concerning the vertical upward integra-
tion of television operators or movie theater owners into the pro-
duction of programs or films, upward integration may mean
more difficult entries for independent producers or distributors
of films or programs, but it does not necessarily lead to a reduc-
tion in aggregate welfare in the long term. This type of vertical
integration may, at least in the long term, have very different
implications than does the downward integration of operators of
essential facilities in the telecommunication sector. Depending
upon the goal assigned to competition law (protection of com-
petition or maximization of global welfare through the competi-
tive process) competition enforcerment authorities may assess
the same set of facts quite differently. The potential conflict be-
tween the desire to prevent foreclosure of competitors and the
desire to promote competition is very obvious in France where a
number of regulations concerning books, the release of first-run
films in movie theaters, and local content requirements for tele-
vision service providers are designed to ensure that French film-
makers or authors are not prevented from gaining market access
and to ensure pluralism, have restricted competition between
service providers.
Another source of difficulty is the assessment, from the
point of view of competition law, of the contractual relationships
between content providers and service providers in the media
industry. The intellectual property rights attached to the crea-
tion of original works allow the creators of programs or the pro-
ducers of events to negotiate with service providers for the
broadcast rights, performance rights, and publishing of such
works. The rights granted to service providers are often exclu-
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sive rights because in most cases exclusivity makes the rights
more valuable to service providers and therefore increases the
price such providers are willing to pay to secure the rights. The
refusal by a service provider to sublicense the exclusive rights it
has acquired or the scope of the exclusivity granted can, in cer-
tain circumstances, reduce competition in the service provider's
market or in adjacent markets. It is thus tempting for competi-
tion authorities to criticize exclusivity clauses or to impose com-
pulsory sublicensing. This temptation will be all the greater
when competition authorities take a narrow short term ap-
proach to market definition, as well as when they takes a limiting
stand on vertical restrictions in general. By doing so, competi-
tion authorities may disregard several factors. In general, the ac-
quisition on an exclusive basis of an intellectual property right
by a service provider only shifts the monopoly power which the
owner of the intellectual property right had over the content
considered to the service provider. Such a shift does not in itself
create monopoly power, although the simultaneous acquisition
of a large number of intellectual property rights by one service
provider may have the effect of foreclosing its competitors from
the market and of restricting competition at the service level. In
addition, the inherent weakness of compulsory licensing meas-
ures in alleviating the aforementioned problem is that such
measures might reduce the value of the intellectual property
rights likely to be acquired. If one believes that intellectual
property rights are designed to foster creation and that fostering
creation increases global welfare, there is a serious risk that in-
creasing competition at the downard level of service providers
through compulsory licensing will have an ambiguous effect on
or may even reduce global welfare. Therefore, compulsory subli-
censing measures should be used only in exceptional cases
where it is likely that the overall impact of such measures will be
to enhance efficiency. In cases where the overall impact of such
measures is not clear, more appropriate means of preventing the
concentration of rights in the hands of a single service provider
should be sought, if possible. Finally, the presence of economic
externalities or of public goods needs to be taken into considera-
tion when assessing some competition cases involving the media,
such as news services or broadcasting rights.
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